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In ten years of war against an agile non-state actor, its fluid franchises, and 
its outlier allies, the United States has experimented with a variety of means 
for containing the enemy.  This adversary presented an unfamiliar combination 
of features: it was not bound by geographical trappings of statehood—capital, 
borders, territory—yet was capable of exercising global reach.  Faced with 
such an adversary, the U.S. government concentrated on defining, locating, and 
pinning down a shifting threat.  Detention became a primary tool in the task of 
introducing fixity to fluidity.  The United States has now accrued a decade of 
experience in practicing detention during war against a non-state foe. 
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Law on detention is not settled, and policy on detention and detainee 
treatment is still a matter of active wrangling between the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches. 1   Political leaders and the public face a 
situation aptly described as a “mess” of detentions:2 166 remaining detainees at 
                                                 
 1. In the last legislative year before this Article was published, Congress again reformed 
the law governing detention in armed conflicts.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §§ 1021–1024, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562–66  (2011) (to be codified at 
10 U.S.C. § 801 note).  On September 12, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York issued a permanent injunction against enforcement of one of the law’s provisions, 
Section 1021(b)(2), which expanded the scope of activities and persons potentially subject to 
indefinite detention for activities understood to be opposed to the U.S. government in its war 
against al Qaeda and affiliates.  Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 (KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at 
*45 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012), injunction stayed by Nos. 12-3176 (L), 12-3644 (Con.), 2012 WL 
4075626 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2012) (staying the injunction only two days after the district court 
granted it).  Litigation on the matter continues. 
During the drafting process, several provisions of the 2012 Defense Authorization bill 
related to procedures for handling detainees had already met with administration objections.  See, 
e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. § 1036 
(2011) (substituting a new system of review for the system established by Exec. Order No. 
13,567, 3 C.F.R. 227 (2011)); id. § 1039 (preventing the Executive from transferring detainees to 
the United States for trial, imprisonment, or release if exonerated); id. § 1040 (restricting transfers 
of detainees to foreign countries).  The White House officially registered its objections and 
threatened a veto if those provisions were included in the final bill.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 
1540 – NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 2012, at 2–3 (2011) (“If the final bill 
presented to the President includes these provisions that challenge critical Executive branch 
authority, the President’s senior advisors would recommend a veto.”).  Congress removed some 
provisions, including sections 1036 and 1039, and amended others.  The President signed the final 
bill to approve defense appropriations, but simultaneously issued a signing statement expressing 
the administration’s “serious reservations” to some remaining provisions regarding detainee 
treatment.  Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 978 (Dec. 31, 2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201100978/pdf/DCPD-201100978.pdf (explaining that the 
President signed the bill in order to appropriate funds for military operations “despite having 
serious reservations with certain provisions that regulate the detention, interrogation, and 
prosecution of suspected terrorists”).  The administration subsequently reasserted executive 
authority to try terrorism suspects in Article III courts (i.e., to waive the transfer of suspected 
terrorists to military custody that the bill sought to require).  See Directive on Procedures 
Implementing Section 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 
Presidential Policy Directive 14, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 14 (Feb. 28, 2012) [hereinafter 
Presidential Policy Directive], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-20120013 
6/pdf/DCPD-201200136.pdf. 
On a parallel track, states party to the Geneva Conventions have concluded their quadrennial 
review, which included international law regarding detention on its agenda, keeping the issue of 
detention in play in interstate diplomacy as well.  See Int’l Committee of the Red Cross, 
Strengthening Legal Protections for Victims of Armed Conflicts Report, 31IC/11/5.1.1 (Oct. 
2011). 
 2. Referring to the Guantanamo Bay facility, the 240 detainees interned therein when his 
administration took office, and the policies and practices that had produced them, President 
Barack Obama described the situation, stating: “We’re cleaning up something that is, quite 
simply, a mess—a misguided experiment . . . .”  Remarks at the National Archives and Records 
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the Guantanamo Bay facilities, 3  3,200 more detainees at facilities in 
Afghanistan, 4  and a jumbled legacy of practice 5  and precedent 6  that itself 
remains to be sorted through.  This Article is one of a series of projects 
motivated by concern over effective advocacy by a U.S. legal community 
confronting extensions of executive power after 9/11.7  The aim of this Article 
is to reflect on these recent experiences with practices of detention and to 
propose changes to lawyerly strategy, national security policy, and 
international law in regard to detention and detainees with an eye toward future 
conduct. 
Our conceptual vocabulary has not kept pace with experience.  Although 
legal experts, the press, and the public rely on one generic term, “detention,” 
                                                                                                                 
Administration, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 388 (May 21, 2009) [hereinafter National 
Archives Speech], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900388/pdf/DCPD 
-200900388.pdf. 
 3. By the Numbers, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 27, 2007, 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2007/11/27/322461/by-the-numbers.html (last updated Dec. 24, 
2012). 
 4. Detainees in Afghanistan were scattered among different facilities until U.S. forces 
consolidated theater detention operations at Bagram Air Force Base in Parwan province, 
Afghanistan.  Matthew C. Waxman, The Law of Armed Conflict and Detention Operations in 
Afghanistan, 85 INT’L L. STUD. 343, 344 (2009).  The facility, formerly called the Bagram 
Collection Point, was known as the Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF) until its nearby 
successor, the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP), was constructed.  As of March 2012, the 
United States reportedly held 3,200 detainees in Afghanistan.  Rod Nordland, U.S. and 
Afghanistan Agree on Prisoner Transfer as Part of Long-term Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 
2012, at A9.  Currently, the planned transfer of the Parwan facility from U.S./ISAF to Afghan 
government control has been cast into doubt.  See infra notes 48–56 (describing the transfer 
process and the glitch). 
 5. The legacy includes detainees, detention facilities, and detention practices in Iraq no 
longer under U.S. control that, while they were under U.S. government control, affected hundreds 
of Iraqi civilians as well as combatants.  During the period when those facilities were under U.S. 
control, U.S. military, intelligence operatives, or contractors were found responsible in at least 
seventy-one cases of detainee abuse, including at least six deaths of Iraqis in U.S. custody.  A.T. 
CHURCH, III, DEP’T. OF DEF., REVIEW OF DETENTION OPERATIONS AND INTERROGATION 
TECHNIQUES 12 (2005) [hereinafter THE CHURCH REPORT], officially redacted and released 
excerpts available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/Church 
_Report_pp235and242.pdf.  An unauthorized document purporting to be the unredacted Church 
Report is available at http://www.aclu.org/images/torture/asset_upload_file625_26068.pdf.  The 
report is so-called after Naval Inspector General, Vice Admiral Albert T. Church, III, who headed 
the team that investigated and reported on U.S. interrogation practices in the global “war on 
terror” at the behest of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, after photos of detainee abuse at the Abu 
Ghraib detention facility in Iraq became public. 
 6. “Legacy of precedent” refers not only to judicial precedent, which is significant in its 
own right, see infra Part II, but also to the jumble of policy justifications, ad hoc  
decision-making, extensions of executive power, bureaucracies and institutions, and the imprint 
on bodies and lives interned at U.S. government installations that the Obama administration 
inherited when it took office in January 2009. 
 7. See, e.g., Monica Eppinger, Military Tribunals: A Critical Assessment, 56 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 1153 (2012). 
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the U.S. executive branch has actually practiced at least three different modes 
of detention in the “war on terror”: criminal detention, national security 
detention for the purpose of prevention (preventive detention), and national 
security detention for the purpose of interrogation (interrogative detention).  
Reliance on an overgeneralized term glosses over important distinctions with 
serious practical effects.  When the general term “detention” in current usage is 
taken to mean only “criminal detention,” it reflects a misunderstanding of what 
national security experts are actually working on.  Framing the issue so 
narrowly leads to limited effectiveness in persuasion or diagnosis, insofar as it 
fails to take into account some of the organizational and ethical features of the 
domain of national security or results in misrecognition of some kinds of 
executive branch conduct.  Reconceiving detention based on observation of its 
actual practice should yield clarity and specificity that will serve future 
advocacy efforts. 
This Article has several goals.  The first is to survey the modes in which the 
U.S. executive branch has practiced detention against non-state actors since 
9/11.  A second goal is to address part of that gap between legal practitioners 
and national security practitioners, particularly as it concerns detention in the 
“war on terror.”  This Article builds on the work of other scholars and 
advocates who have directed attention to preventive or interrogative detention8 
and is meant to augment work on the criminal paradigm.9 
This gap, apparent among domestic practitioners, is less pronounced in 
international law.  The international legal community has long made legal 
provision for preventive detention during combat under customary 
international law aimed at rendering fighters hors de combat.10  However, even 
the international legal community, perhaps for tactical reasons, has declined to 
modify the international law that regulates interrogative detention.11  Thus, a 
third goal of this Article is to put forth some proposals for innovation in the 
                                                 
 8. See, e.g., Tyler Davidson & Kathleen Gibson, Experts Meeting on Security Detention 
Report: International Committee of the Red Cross & the Frederick K. Cox International Law 
Center, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 323, 372–73 (2009) (summarizing presentations made at a 
meeting of experts convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Frederick 
K. Cox International Law Center at Case Western Reserve University devoted to legal and 
practical issues associated with “security detention”); John P. McLoughlin et al., Security 
Detention, Terrorism, and the Prevention Imperative, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 463, 492–503 
(2009) (outlining likely characteristics of, and questions associated with, a new U.S. “security 
detention process”); see also Laura M. Olson, Practical Challenges of Implementing the 
Complementarity Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law–Demonstrated by 
the Procedural Regulation of Internment in Non-International Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 437, 438–39 (2009). 
 9. See generally Eric M. Freedman, Who’s Afraid of the Criminal Law Paradigm in the 
“War on Terror?”, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 323 (2007). 
 10. See infra Part II.C (providing additional description). 
 11. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross & Red Crescent [ICRC], Background Document for the 
31st International Conference of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 5–6 (2011), 
[hereinafter ICRC Background Document]. 
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international law of war.  These proposals are based on observation of state 
practice in regard to detention in an attempt to incorporate the diverse national 
security motivations that currently drive detention policy. 
Part I of this Article reviews detention as practiced by the U.S. executive 
branch in the “war on terror.”  This review provides ground to propose an 
expanded conceptualization of detention.  Part II examines the legal contours 
of the present context, reporting the source of law by which the executive 
justifies its practices of detention in the “war on terror.”  Part II also outlines 
the definitional distinctions that international law currently provides between 
international and non-international armed conflict and the consequences of 
those classifications.  Part III proposes a framework for understanding the 
conceptual contours of detention and suggests that lawyers and human rights 
advocates turn greater attention to the two other forms of detention practiced 
by the executive branch in addition to that with which advocates are more 
familiar—criminal detention.  Part IV calls for release of detainees held in 
preventive detention at the cessation of hostilities and makes proposals, based 
on recent experience, regarding tribunals in all three forms of detention 
outlined herein. 
I.  THE STATUS QUO: WHY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT ENOUGH 
A.  Detention in Practice 
1.  Guantanamo: From Rasul to Stall 
The vast majority of legal efforts on behalf of detainees held in the “war on 
terror” have concentrated on detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.12   U.S. 
civilian and military attorneys strove to force the executive branch to accord 
Guantanamo detainees due process.  This entailed disputing whether any 
process was due and then building procedure from the ground up.  Attorneys 
sought first to secure federal jurisdiction for detainees at Guantanamo13 and to 
file habeas corpus petitions for them. 14   Once the executive announced 
                                                 
 12. See, e.g., Waxman, supra note 4, at 343 (discussing the relative neglect by the U.S. legal 
community of commission trials or processing procedures for Bagram detainees).  But see THE 
OPEN SOC’Y INST. & THE LIAISON OFFICE, STRANGERS AT THE DOOR: NIGHT RAIDS BY 
INTERNATIONAL FORCES LOSE HEARTS AND MINDS OF AFGHANS (2010) [hereinafter 
STRANGERS AT THE DOOR], available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites 
/default/files/a-afghan-night-raids-20100222_0.pdf (for rights-advocates’ study of U.S. and ISAF 
detention-related night raids in Afghanistan). 
 13. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C.  
§ 2241, authorizes U.S. federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction over foreign nationals held at the U.S. 
Navy facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 
(2008) (holding that petitioners, Guantanamo detainees, had a constitutional right to habeas 
review). 
 14. See generally JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL 33180, ENEMY COMBATANT DETAINEES: HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURT 
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formation of a military commission to try some detainees, attorneys filed 
actions seeking to address serious shortcomings with due process in the 
commission.15  The actions do not affect detainees who are not American 
citizens; the executive branch transferred American-citizen detainees to U.S. 
military detention facilities in the United States, and attorneys there promptly 
filed habeas petitions on their behalf.16  As a general matter, those representing 
detainees and others trying to influence U.S. government treatment of “war on 
terror” detainees focused their efforts on securing detainees a fair trial.17 
When the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush that U.S. civilian courts have 
jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions from alien detainees held by the 
U.S. military at Guantanamo Bay,18 criminal procedure seemed vindicated as a 
mode of ensuring humane treatment and fair review for detainees. Certainly, 
the Court’s holding regarding federal jurisdiction together with subsequent 
cases regarding detainee rights to trial19 prompted institutional innovation by 
the executive branch holding detainees and accelerated the institution of 
military commissions.  In retrospect, however, it is clear that the habeas route 
did not fulfill all the hopes of detainees and their advocates.20 
The scope of that failed promise is significant.  For most detainees over the 
last ten years, detention has been the product of decisions made outside of the 
Military Commission system.21  Since 2002, 779 detainees have been held at 
Guantanamo.22  Under both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, 
the Military Commission has only dealt with sixteen Guantanamo detainees, 
                                                                                                                 
(2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33180_20100405.pdf.  For a sample of 
habeas petitions filed, see, for example, Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Bacha 
v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2009); Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 
2009); Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2009); Hammamy v. Obama, 604 F. Supp. 
2d 240 (D.D.C. 2009); El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Alwi v. Bush, 
593 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2008); Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008); Al Bihani v. 
Bush, 588 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2008); Al Ginco v. Bush, 588 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2008); 
Al-Adahi v. Bush, 585 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2008); and Khadar v. Bush, No. 04-1136 (JDB), 
2006 WL 2666144 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2006), superseded sub nom. Hicks v. Bush, 452 F. Supp. 2d 
88 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 15. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  Note that Hamdan is exceptional in that 
Hamdan’s lawyers petitioned for the writ of habeas corpus and for a writ of mandamus on his 
behalf.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 155 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 16. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 511 (2004); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 
390 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 17. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., ELSEA & GARCIA, supra 
note 14. 
 18. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481–84 (2004). 
 19. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557. 
 20. See ELSEA & GARCIA, supra note 14, at 2. 
 21. See Eppinger, supra note 7 (describing how most decisions regarding detention have 
happened outside of military commissions). 
 22. The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/ (last 
updated Dec. 11, 2012). 
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convicting seven, charging six, and sentencing three who plead guilty. 23  
Obama administration review panels have designated thirty-six more detainees 
eligible for trial by the Military Commission.24  To date, of a total number of 
779 Guantanamo detainees, 763 have not faced a Military Commission, and of 
those, 727 never will.25  Procedures other than trial have decided the fates of 
many, such as the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which 
reviewed the cases of 581 Guantanamo detainees during the Bush 
administration (commencing July 30, 2004 and ceasing February, 10, 2009, 
within three weeks of President Obama’s inauguration). 26   The CSRTs 
designated 578 of these cases “Civilian Authority Final Action,” determining 
that 539 detainees had been properly classified as enemy combatants and that 
thirty-nine detainees—no longer classified as such—should be transferred 
from Guantanamo and thus out of the jurisdiction of the Military 
Commission. 27   Under the Obama administration, no detainees have been 
added to the population at Guantanamo.  Twenty-one detainees have been 
ordered released by the courts,28 and the Military Commission will have dealt 
with approximately forty-nine detainees of a known Guantanamo detainee 
population of 779.29 
The limited reach of formal trial procedures to affect detention at 
Guantanamo is also reflected in the numbers of tribunals, besides formally 
constituted military commissions, that have determined initial detention  
or reviewed detainees’ continued detention. 30   The Bush administration 
established the CSRTs31 in response to the Supreme Court’s rebuke in Rasul 
                                                 
 23. Id.  Only three of these convictions occurred during the Bush administration.  Id.  The 
other thirteen are included in the thirty-six detainees identified by the Obama administration’s 
tribunals.  Id. 
 24. By the Numbers, supra note 3. 
 25. Id.; The Guantanamo Docket, supra note 22. 
 26. Combatant Status Review Tribunal Summary, OFF. ADMIN. REV. DETENTION ENEMY 
COMBATANTS, http://www.defense.gov/news/csrtsummary.pdf (last updated Feb. 10, 2009). 
 27. Id.; ELSEA & GARCIA, supra note 14, at 7–9 (noting that detainees not found to be an 
enemy combatant by a CSRT are either to be transferred to their country of citizenship or dealt 
with in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign policy, and thus are no longer under the jurisdiction 
of military commissions).  The remaining three cases were the result of a temporary suspension of 
the Administrative Reviews for Guantanamo detainees.  Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
Summary, supra note 26. 
 28. See National Archives Speech, supra note 2. 
 29. By the Numbers, supra note 3 (reporting that, at a maximum, totaling the number of 
detainees already convicted, those facing trial, and those eligible for trial, the commissions will 
have only heard forty-nine cases out of 779); see also The Guantanamo Docket, supra note 22. 
 30. See, e.g., ELSEA & GARCIA, supra note 14, at 7–9, 47 (referencing a sample of 
additional tribunals that have the authority to make initial detention decisions or to oversee 
reviews for continued detention); Eppinger, supra note 7 (describing a range of informal tribunals 
as formal bodies tasked to make detention decisions). 
 31. Combatant Status Review Tribunals, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Sept. 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Oct2006/d20061017CSRT.pdf. 
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and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld of the administration’s procedures for designating a 
detainee an “enemy combatant.”32  When President Obama took office, his 
administration created a task force to review the case of each Guantanamo 
detainee to assess the possibility of change, transfer, or release.33  The Obama 
administration subsequently created Periodic Review Boards (PRBs) to 
conduct regular review of the justification for continued detention of each 
Guantanamo detainee.34  These justifications are primarily based on national 
security considerations, not legal factors. 
2.  Parwan 
The detainee counts of Guantanamo do not include the 3,200-plus detainees 
that have been held in Afghanistan, none of whom have faced a formally 
constituted military commission or other court.  The United States and its 
allied forces hold detainees at the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP) or at 
field detention sites.35  The population of the field detention sites, like their 
number and location, is not a matter of public record36 and, in precise terms, 
may not even be known to U.S. authorities with command responsibility in 
Afghanistan on a daily basis.37  From publicly available information, it appears 
that most detainees in Afghanistan have been held at the DFIP (or its 
predecessor, the Bagram Theater Internment Facility).38 
None of the Afghanistan detainees have had formal hearings before a 
military commission, although other forms of tribunals have been introduced.  
Beginning in October 2001, when the United Statesand its allies commenced 
                                                 
 32. Id.; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 33. Exec. Order No. 13,493, 3 C.F.R. 207 (2009); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Legal 
Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law (March 25, 2010), transcript available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.  As the preceding recitation shows, most 
detainees continued in detention without change, transfer, or release. 
 34. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 3 C.F.R. 277 (2011) (Periodic Review of Individuals Detained 
at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force). 
 35. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, DETAINED AND DENIED IN AFGHANISTAN: HOW TO MAKE U.S. 
DETENTION COMPLY WITH THE LAW 7–8 (2011). 
 36. Dep’t of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Navy Vice Admiral Robert Harward, 
Commander, Joint Task Force 435, via Teleconference (Jan. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Dep’t of Def. 
Roundtable], available at http://defense.gov/Blog_files/Blog_assets/20100127_Harward 
_transcript.pdf. 
 37. Id. 
 38. AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REPORT 2012: THE STATES OF 
THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 56, 357 (2012), available at 
http://files.amnesty.org/air12/air_2012_full_en.pdf; Muhammad Lila, U.S. to Hand over Afghan 
Prisons, Including Jail Where Korans Were Burned, ABC NEWS (Mar. 9,  
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/international/us-hand-afghan-prisons-including-koran-burning 
-prison/?id=15884015; Andy Worthington, Bagram: The First Ever Prisoner List (The Annotated 
Version), ANDY WORTHINGTON, www.andyworthington.co.uk/bagram-the-first-ever-prisoner-l 
ist-the-annotated-version/ (last updated Apr. 3, 2011). 
2013] Detention in the War on Terror 333 
military action in Afghanistan, military screening teams were tasked with 
locating people who were possible sources of intelligence and taking them into 
custody. 39   Detention was part of the intelligence-gathering strategy in 
Afghanistan from the beginning of combat operations and may even have 
eclipsed combat operation at times.  U.S. military teams conducted night raids 
and sweeps, 40  screening teams combed Northern Alliance prisons, 41  and 
roadblocks filtered mobile populations.42 
Although intelligence was a primary goal, the vast majority and diverse 
sources of those in U.S. custody from the beginning of combat operations in 
Afghanistan meant that, initially and at many points during the conflict, U.S. 
authorities did not know who they held.43  One Bush administration official 
recalls, 
Before we went in to Afghanistan [in September 2001], we expected 
to find Saudis plus a few Yemenis and Afghans [making up al Qaeda 
forces and camps].  That quickly turned out to be much more 
complicated.  By the end, we had detainees representing 44 different 
countries.  That’s why this turned into a “Global War on Terror.”  
Not necessarily because they were militarily active all over the 
world, but because they were recruiting all over the world.  That 
shows you what we were up against.44 
In this mélange and other complicated scenarios, the U.S. executive branch 
created groups tasked to process detainees encountered in criminal 
                                                 
 39. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 534 (E.D. Va. 2002) (discussing the Mobbs 
Declaration and the military screening of Yaser Hamdi); see also JONATHAN MAHLER, THE 
CHALLENGE: HOW A MAVERICK NAVY OFFICER AND A YOUNG LAW PROFESSOR RISKED THEIR 
CAREERS TO DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION—AND WON 10–11, 93–94 (2009).  For a more vivid 
and chaotic description of in-theater screening in the midst of combat operations among a civilian 
population, see, for example, The Church Report, supra note 5, at 14. 
 40. See generally STRANGERS AT THE DOOR, supra note 12. 
 41. MAHLER, supra note 39, at 93–94 (describing the work of U.S. military screening teams 
who selected detainees from among those offered by Northern Alliance field commanders, prison 
operators, and bounty hunters). 
 42. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (describing how Yasser Hamdi was 
apprehended at a road block by local forces and turned over to the U.S. military).  
 43. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at Joint App. 148–50, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696), available at 2004 WL 1120871, at *148–50 ("Declaration of 
Michael Mobbs"); Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and 
Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365,  
1369–70 (2008). 
 44. Telephone Interview with the Honorable Pierre-Richard Prosper, former  
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State (Nov. 22, 2011). 
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investigations, combat operations, and intelligence work.45  In Afghanistan, 
detainees were sorted in the field and at detention facilities.46 
The facility in Parwan where most detainees are consolidated, the DFIP, is 
distinct enough in the situation of detainees, its management by U.S. 
authorities, and the legal issues it raises, that it deserves a brief, separate 
discussion.  The DFIP was established to replace the hastily reconfigured 
Bagram detention facility that was poorly equipped to handle the number of 
detainees it received and that had developed a reputation for poor conditions 
and, in some respects, detainee abuse.47  Given the schedule of announced 
timetables for the U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan, practically from its 
inception, the DFIP was intended for transfer to Afghan government 
authority.48 
On March 9, 2012, the governments of the United States and Afghanistan 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)49 to transfer management of 
the DFIP “as soon as the Afghans appoint a commander of detention 
operations.”50  On March 28, 2012, that condition was satisfied when President 
Hamid Karzai named Major General Faroq Barekzai as the Afghan 
commander.51  Notably, the MOU distinguishes management of the facility 
from custody of detainees, however, and specifies that the United States would 
transfer management of the facility as soon as the Afghan government 
appointed a commander of detention operations.52  The MOU further specified 
that the United States would at that time “transfer Afghan nationals detained 
                                                 
 45. RICHARD J. HUGHBANK & JENNIFER L. CURRY, THE DETAINEE PERSONAL 
IDENTIFICATION DATA COLLECTION PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN (2002). 
 46. See generally INT’L SEC. ASSISTANCE FORCE, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES: 
DETENTION OF NON-ISAF PERSONNEL, SOP 362 (4th ed. 2006), available at 
http://info.publicintelligence.net/ISAF-DetaineeSOP.pdf (outlining detention procedures for 
enemy combatants). 
 47. See, e.g., Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 2005, at A1, A12; U.S. Abused Detainees, Afghan Commission Claims, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 8, 2012, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/01/08/afghanistan 
-detainee-abuse-bagram.html. 
 48. Richard Leiby, U.S. Transfers Control of Military Prison to Afghan Officials, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 11, 2012, at A10. 
 49. Memorandum of Understanding, Transfer of U.S. Detention Facilities in Afghan 
Territory to Afghanistan, U.S.–Afg., Mar. 9, 2012 [hereinafter MOU], available at 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/20120408_01_memo.pdf.  General John R. Allen, ISAF 
Commander of both the U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, represented the United States 
and Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak represented Afghanistan.  Id. 
 50. News Release, Int’l Sec. Assistance Force, U.S., Afghanistan Agree to Turnover Parwan 
Detention Facility (Mar. 9, 2012), available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/u.s 
.-afghanistan-agree-to-turnover-of-parwan-detention-facility.html. 
 51. News Release, Int’l Sec. Assistance Force, USF-A Commander, U.S. Ambassador 
Congratulate New Parwan Facility Commander (Apr. 1, 2012), available at http://www.isaf.nato 
.int/article/news/usf-a-commander-u.s.-ambassador-congratulate-new-parwan-facility-commander 
.html. 
 52. MOU, supra note 49, at para. 6(a). 
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by U.S. forces at the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP) to Afghanistan”53 
but would retain “responsibility for the detainees held by . . . DFIP under the 
Law of Armed Conflict during the processing and transfer period, which is not 
to last more than six months.”54  Although the six-month period has expired, 
transfer of management of the DFIP has stumbled. 
In any case, U.S. personnel will likely continue to play a decisive role in the 
fate of detainees whom it took into custody.  The United States agreed to 
“continue its presence at the DFIP in order to provide advisory, technical and 
logistical support for a period of one year.”55  Afghanistan agreed to “consult 
with the United States before the release, including release prior to indictment, 
of the transferred detainees, and, if the United States provides its assessment 
that continued detention is necessary to prevent the detainee from engaging in 
or facilitating terrorist activity, Afghanistan is to consider favorably such 
assessment.” 56   In short, although there are non-judicial bodies making 
decisions about U.S. detainees in Afghanistan, none of the thousands of 
detainees held there are bound for trial before a formally constituted tribunal.  
Very few were apparently held for the purpose of criminal detention.  The 
outcomes for those initially apprehended by U.S. forces for U.S. national 
security purposes—prevention or interrogation—becomes even more unclear 
as the major detention facility switches to Afghan control. 
B.  Grounds for Re-Conceptualizing Detention 
The foregoing should inform advocates’ agenda in that it demonstrates how 
limited criminal detention has been in the context of hostilities against a  
non-state foe.  It attests to the inadequacy of a narrow focus on gaining access 
to civilian court, court martial, or a procedurally fair military  
commission—efforts that help only a fraction of all detainees and address only 
part of the executive branch bureaucracy that performs a sorting function.  
Advocates with a narrow agenda based on a criminal detention paradigm do a 
disservice to the majority of detainees excluded from the very framing of the 
problem. 
If detainees are not bound for trial, what is the point of holding them?  The 
U.S. executive branch has engaged in different modes of detention in the 
current conflict, conducting detention for varying purposes.  One, “criminal 
detention,” refers to detention of someone who authorities suspect may have 
already committed a hostile act.57  Authorities hold the detainee to conduct an 
investigation, intending to bring a suspect to trial.  Another mode of detention, 
                                                 
 53. Id. at para. 4 (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. at para. 6(c). 
 55. Id. at para. 6(e). 
 56. Id. at para. 9. 
 57. Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and 
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (2008) (explaining that criminal 
punishment aims to condemn, punish, and/or provide retribution for past conduct). 
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practiced within a national security paradigm, may be for the purpose of 
preventing some future act from occurring: stopping a combatant from 
returning to the battlefield, a suspected accomplice from aiding terrorists, or a 
suspected terrorist from committing a hostile act.  This is detention practiced as 
a mode of prevention.58  Another purpose of detention may be questioning a 
possible informant and gathering information.  This is detention practiced in a 
mode of interrogation. 
Historically, criminal detention and national security detention have 
intersected when persons held in preventive detention have been subject to trial 
for crimes against the laws of war or for violations of martial law, often after 
hostilities have ceased.59  Otherwise, the role of trial in wartime detention is 
limited.  Detainee rights advocates, however, have at times used the concepts 
and language of criminal detention to critique the executive branch’s other 
practices of detention.60 
A narrow conceptualization of detention has significant consequences.  
Thinking of all detention as criminal detention collapses different modes of 
detention, conducted for different purposes, into one category.  That, in turn, 
superimposes the motivations that regulate criminal detention—i.e., the search 
for truth in assessing guilt or innocence at trial—and the criminal procedures 
that have evolved in answer to those motivations onto other modes for which 
they are ill-suited.  U.S. police forces do not torture suspects in custody 
because of professional ethics as well as legal constraints;61 but those ethics 
have arisen, in part, out of the knowledge that obtaining information that 
cannot be introduced at trial defeats the purpose of holding a suspect in 
                                                 
 58. See, e.g., Stephanie Cooper Blum, Preventative Detention in the War on Terror: A 
Comparison of How the United States, Britain, and Israel Detain and Incapacitate Terrorist 
Suspects, HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, Oct. 2008, at 1, 3 (explaining that the purpose of 
preventive detention is to incapacitate a suspect when criminal charges are not feasible). 
 59. See, e.g., TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INT’L MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945 – 1 OCTOBER 1946, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/imt.asp; INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR 
EAST (1948), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/index.html.  But see Ex 
Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (regarding a military commission that operated while hostilities 
were ongoing). 
 60. See, e.g., STRANGERS AT THE DOOR, supra note 12, at 2 (arguing that night raids 
compound due process problems). 
 61. The law of evidence holds that information gained through involuntary confession is not 
admissible as evidence at trial.  The so-called “exclusionary rule” is grounded in the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments, though not explicitly stated in either.  See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V; see 
also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (holding that self-incriminating testimony 
compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment is inadmissible); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that involuntary confessions are inadmissible as evidence in federal 
court); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (adopting the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree” doctrine); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule 
is binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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criminal detention in the first place.62  There is no reward for a police force 
that repeatedly loses cases because evidence was obtained in ways that render 
it inadmissible in court.  The exclusionary rule keeps institutional incentives 
aligned.63 
By contrast, an intelligence officer tasked with obtaining actionable 
intelligence or a combat soldier tasked with thwarting an attack by an 
adversary may initiate detention without ever intending to take a detainee to 
trial.  For those practicing forms of detention outside of the criminal paradigm, 
due process protections are institutionally meaningless.  Extending the norms 
and practices of U.S. criminal procedures designed to ensure fair trials is 
ineffectual at aligning institutional incentives to ensure humane treatment or 
prompt review of detainees in the context of interrogative or preventive 
detention.64 
II.  LEGAL CONTOURS OF DETENTION IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT 
A.  Domestic U.S. Law 
The executive branch normally conducts criminal detention within the 
parameters of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.65  The executive branch 
bases its claims of legal authority for depriving persons of liberty in connection 
with its pursuit of the war against al Qaeda and affiliates on the Authorization 
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress in the days 
following the 9/11 attacks.66  On the basis of the AUMF, President Bush issued 
a Military Order on November 13, 2001, authorizing indefinite detention of 
                                                 
 62. See Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 342, 357 (1967) (“Unlike many deterrent mechanisms the exclusionary rule does not 
achieve its effect by the infliction of sanctions, but rather by the removal of incentives.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 63. See id. (discussing how “the [exclusionary] rule encourages police to refrain from 
unreasonable searches not for fear of punishment, but simply because there is no reason for 
making them” (footnotes omitted)). 
 64. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, IF-ASKED GUIDANCE: KEY POINTS ON DETAINEE 
TREATMENT 3 [hereinafter IF-ASKED GUIDANCE], available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi 
/operation_and_plans/Detainee/10-F-0841-KeyPoints_onDetaineeTreatment.pdf (“There is broad 
authority under the laws and customs of war to detain enemy combatants, without any 
requirement to bring criminal charges while hostilities last.  Criminal law provisions, whether in 
the U.S. or elsewhere, simply are not relevant here.”); see also infra Part III.A (providing a 
discussion of detention modeled on U.S. criminal procedure). 
 65. U.S. CONST. amend. V (declaring that no person may “be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating “nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). 
 66. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)) (granting the President authority “to use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001”). 
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anyone the President had “reason to believe . . . was a member of . . . al Qaida; 
ha[d] engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of 
international terrorism” against the United States, or had harbored any of the 
same.67  The substance of that order has survived challenge, although the fate 
of Congress’s latest attempt to expand the scope of the executive’s detention 
authority, subject to pending challenge in the courts, is as yet unknown.68 
B.  Detention During International Armed Conflict: The POW Model 
The law of war, or international humanitarian law, recognizes two kinds of 
conflicts: international armed conflicts, meaning conflicts between states,69 and 
non-international armed conflicts, meaning conflicts between a state and a  
non-state actor or between non-state actors.70  The hostilities conducted under 
the “war on terror” have encompassed both conflicts. 71   International law 
                                                 
 67. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918, 919 (2002). 
 68. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,  
§ 1021(b), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note) (expanding the 
scope of activities and persons potentially subject to indefinite detention for activities opposed to 
the U.S. government in its war against al Qaeda and its affiliates).  This attempt to expand the 
scope of the executive branch’s detention authority beyond the basis provided by the AUMF has 
been successfully challenged as this Article goes to press, but the injunction granted by the 
Southern District of New York has since been stayed by the Second Circuit.  See Hedges v. 
Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 (KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at *45 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012), injunction 
stayed by Nos. 12-3176 (L), 12-3644(Con.), 2012 WL 4075626 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2012); see also 
supra note 1. 
 69. Pursuant to Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the legal category of 
“international armed conflict” applies “to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more [states party to the Geneva Conventions] even if the state 
of war is not recognized by one of them.”  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
Sea, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136–68 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; see also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross 
[ICRC], Opinion Paper, How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International 
Humanitarian Law?, at 1 (Mar. 2008), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf (describing one type 
of armed conflict under international humanitarian law as “international armed conflicts, 
opposing two or more States”). 
 70. See Common Article 3, First Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 3 (defining  
non-international armed conflicts); Second Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 3 (same); 
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 3 (same); Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 
69, at art. 3 (same); see also infra note 92.  Common Article 3 is so named because it appears in 
all four Geneva Conventions.  For an expert opinion on what is considered “armed conflict” of 
any sort under international law of war, see ICRC, supra note 69, at 3–5. 
 71. See, e.g., U.N. G.A. Rep. of the Human Rights Council, May 28, 2010, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Addendum, Study on 
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would characterize the United States’ war against Iraq (March 2003 to 
December 2011) as an “international armed conflict,” in that U.S. government 
forces fought against Iraqi government forces.72  International legal consensus 
is that, in Afghanistan, the United States and its NATO allies have been 
engaged in “non-international armed conflict.”73  Consensus breaks regarding 
hostilities in which the United States is engaged elsewhere in the name of 
combatting al Qaeda, with the U.S. government arguing that non-international 
armed conflict can transcend borders.74  Other governments and legal experts, 
however, reject the notion that non-international armed conflict, such as the 
one in Afghanistan, can legally transcend borders.  They consider hostilities 
outside the boundaries of Afghanistan to be beyond the scope of that conflict, 
thus outside any category of hostilities permitted or regulated by the 
international law of war.75 
These categorizations set the legal parameters for detention.  In an 
international armed conflict, a member of an adversary force who surrenders or 
is captured is classified as a prisoner of war (POW)76 and may be subject to 
                                                                                                                 
Targeted Killings, ¶¶ 50–54, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (2010), available  
at http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf 
(distinguishing international armed conflicts from non-international armed conflicts and applying 
the principles of each to the isolated conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the wider 
conflicts with the Taliban and al Qaeda); Diane Webber, Preventive Detention in the Law of 
Armed Conflict: Throwing Away the Key?, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 167, 176 (2012) 
(characterizing the initial phases of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts as international armed 
conflicts, which transitioned out of this classification). 
 72. See, e.g., ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary 
Armed Conflicts, at 10, 31IC/11/5.1.2 (Oct. 2011). 
 73. For representative views of the international community, see id. at 10–11.  The war in 
Afghanistan can be defined as “multinational armed forces . . . fighting alongside the armed 
forces of a ‘host’ state—in its territory—against one or more organized armed groups.”  Id.  
Therefore, it does not involve two or more opposing states and “must be classified as  
non-international.”  Id.  For the Supreme Court’s reflection on the categorization of the 
Afghanistan hostilities, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629–30 (2006) (leaving 
unresolved whether hostilities against al Qaeda members in Afghanistan are international in 
character, because Common Article 3 applies to signatories of the Geneva Convention when the 
conflict is “occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,” even when the 
conflict is “‘not of an international character.’” (quoting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 
(2005))). 
 74. The United States claims that it is involved in a non-international armed conflict with al 
Qaeda that transcends the borders of Afghanistan.  See Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html.  
But see ICRC, supra note 72, at 10–11 (rejecting the claim “that a conflict of global dimensions is 
or has been taking place”). 
 75. ICRC, supra note 72, at 22 (“Pursuant to other views, which the ICRC shares, the notion 
that a person ‘carries’ a NIAC [non-international armed conflict] with him to the territory of a 
non-belligerent state should not be accepted.”). 
 76. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 4 (describing POWs as individuals 
“belonging to a party to the conflict” and “who have fallen into the power of the enemy”). 
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internment in a closed-perimeter camp facility.77  POW camps are governed by 
the minimum standard guarantees of Common Article III of the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, which prohibits inhumane or degrading treatment of 
prisoners captured in war. 78   Like other states party to the Third Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the United States 
has bound itself to meet certain conditions of food, medical services, clothing, 
and sanitation at facilities in which it interns POWs.79  Further, with particular 
relevance to interrogative detention, the Third Geneva Convention permits a 
Detaining Party to question POWs but prohibits signatory parties from 
practicing coercion or intimidation while doing so.80  In addition to treaty law, 
U.S. statutory law codifies standards for treatment of POWs.81  Expert opinion 
holds that a “detaining state is not obliged to provide [judicial] review . . . of 
POW internment as long as active hostilities are ongoing, because enemy 
combatant status denotes that a person is ipso facto a security threat.”82 
Treaty law also provides rules regarding civilians during an international 
armed conflict.  Civilians may be interned “only if security of the Detaining 
Power makes it absolutely necessary.”83  Some civilians who are not normally 
members of their country’s armed forces may take up the fights as individuals 
or irregular units.  International legal experts agree that civilians “who directly 
                                                 
 77. See id. at art. 21 (stating that “[t]he Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to 
internment.  It may impose on them the obligation of not leaving, beyond certain limits, the camp 
where they are interned, or if the said camp is fenced in, of not going outside its perimeter”).  
Although the Third Geneva Convention permits internment in camp facilities, it does not permit 
internment in a penitentiary.  Id. at art. 22 (stating that, “[e]xcept in particular cases which are 
justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries”). 
 78. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 3 (prohibiting inhumane treatment 
of prisoners including, among other things, “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, 
humiliating and degrading treatment”); Second Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 3 
(same); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 3 (same); Fourth Geneva Convention, 
supra note 69, at art. 3 (same). 
 79. See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at arts. 26–29. 
 80. Id. at art. 17 (“Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give 
only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial 
number, or failing this, equivalent information.  If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render 
himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status. . . .  No physical or 
mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure 
from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be 
threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. . . .  The 
questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.”). 
 81. Conduct by U.S. military personnel toward POWs is regulated by Article 93 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 893 (forbidding “cruelty toward, or 
oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to orders [or the accused] . . . .”).  U.S. 
implementation of the Geneva Conventions with respect to POWs is found primarily in U.S. 
Army Regulation (AR) 190-8 (requiring humane treatment of “all persons captured, detained, 
interned, or otherwise held in U.S. Armed Forces custody during the course of conflict.”). 
 82. ICRC, supra note 72, at 17. 
 83. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 42. 
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participate in hostilities”—such as some “insurgents” in Iraq who were not 
members of the regular Iraqi military—fall into the category of posing an 
immediate threat and may be detained in accord with the law of war. 84  
Regarding other civilians who do not directly participate in hostilities, only in 
narrowly construed circumstances may non-combatant civilians legally be 
subject to “assigned residence” or internment.85  Under treaty law, an interned 
civilian bystander, unlike a POW or a civilian combatant, has the right to 
challenge his or her detention before a court or tribunal and the right to 
automatic review of the need for his or her continued detention at least twice 
per year.86   Whether soldier, insurgent, or civilian under international law 
regulating international armed conflict, an individual’s legal detention ends 
when combat hostilities end, 87  even if insurgency survives state-to-state 
combat.88  The law of war governing international armed conflict provides a 
clear legal framework for detainees. 
C.  Non-International Armed Conflict 
In contrast to the clear provisions regarding detention during international 
armed conflicts, international law is less specific with regard to detention 
during non-international armed conflicts.89  An individual non-state actor, or 
one who acts against a state on behalf of a non-state grouping, is not 
considered a “lawful enemy combatant,” and if detained, is not considered a 
                                                 
 84. ICRC, supra note 72, at 17. 
 85. Id. 
 86.  
Any protected person who has been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be 
entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court 
or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose. If the 
[i]nternment or placing in assigned residence is maintained, the court or 
administrativ[]e []board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give 
consideration to his or her case with a view to the favourable amendment of the 
initial decision, if circumstances permit. 
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 43. 
 87. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 118 (“Prisoners of war shall 
be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”); Fourth Geneva 
Convention, supra note 69, at art. 46 (stating that internment of civilians in a non-international 
armed conflict must cease “as soon as possible after the close of hostilities”); Hague Convention 
with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 20, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 
1817, 187 Consol. T.S. 429 (requiring the release of POWs as soon as possible “[a]fter the 
conclusion of peace”). 
 88. See, e.g., Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, (No. 27021/08), 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1092 
(holding that a state could not hold combatants in preventive detention after state-to-state 
hostilities had ceased, even if an insurgency continued). 
 89. See ICRC, supra note 72, at 17–18 (acknowledging that Common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol II do not enumerate grounds for detention or procedural rights in  
non-international armed conflict). 
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POW.90  How are states obligated to treat such detainees?  Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions still applies and provides minimum standards for 
treatment of any person detained by a state party to the treaty (such as the 
United States), whether the conflict is an international armed conflict or not.91  
Common Article 3 provides: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each 
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the 
following provisions: (I) Persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down 
their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To 
this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any 
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the  
above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in 
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of 
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all 
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples. (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and 
cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to 
the conflict.92 
Past U.S. practice was to train its military forces up to the highest Geneva 
standards and to conduct detention accordingly, whether a conflict was an 
international armed conflict or not.93  The rationale was to reduce confusion for 
U.S. soldiers.  Instead of training to various standards for different kinds of 
conflicts or combatants, the U.S. military trained to one standard that would 
                                                 
 90. Id. at 16 (“POWs are essentially combatants captured by the adverse party in an IAC 
[international armed conflict].”). 
 91. See Common Article Three, supra note 70.  But see IF-ASKED GUIDANCE, supra note 
64, at 2 (“[T]he United States Armed Forces have treated, and will continue to treat, all 
individuals detained at Guantanamo humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with 
military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention, 
even though neither al-Qaida nor Taliban detainees are entitled to POW status.  Even though the 
Guantanamo detainees are not entitled to POW rights and privileges, they are provided, as a 
matter of policy, many privileges similar to POWs.” (emphasis added)). 
 92. Common Article Three, supra note 70. 
 93. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE 6–7, 165–80 (1956). 
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always conform with its Geneva commitments. 94   This eliminated the 
possibility, for example, that U.S. soldiers might have to make battlefield 
judgments about the identity—and hence treatment—of an enemy.  It also 
reduced confusion for soldiers deployed to various conflicts or dealing with 
fluid situations.  The Bush administration eliminated some bright-line 
distinctions in legal opinions issued at its highest levels,95 resulting, it seems, 
in confusion among troops on the ground and, some propose, a consequent 
lowering of standards of detainee treatment.96 
The Common Article III guarantees of minimum standards for material 
conditions of detention and detainee treatment do not include procedures for an 
individual to challenge categorization as a threat, terrorist, or accomplice; 
review of continued detention, whether a combatant or non-combatant;97 nor 
other procedural safeguards for those detained in a non-international armed 
conflict. 98   Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions explicitly 
provides guidance for treatment of those in detention and internment, 99 
implicitly confirming that deprivation of liberty is acceptable practice in  
non-international armed conflict.  However, like Common Article III, 
Additional Protocol II fails to provide legally acceptable grounds or limits for 
internment or to create other procedural rights for detainees.100 
One last legally murky area deserves consideration: armed conflict against a 
non-state actor that crosses borders.101  Could the United States legally detain 
suspected terrorists rounded up in Bosnia, Pakistan, Yemen, or elsewhere in 
operations against al Qaeda and affiliates?  If non-international armed conflict 
can transcend borders, as the United States argues in the face of international 
disagreement, the United States may legally apprehend a suspected terrorist 
                                                 
 94. See, e.g., id.; THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
§ 6.2.5 (1995). 
 95. Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President 2–4 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Torture Memo]; see also 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals, supra note 31; infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 96. See MG ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, DEPUTY COMMANDING GEN. SUPPORT, COAL. FORCES 
LAND COMPONENT COMMAND, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE 
BRIGADE 12 (2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT], available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs 
/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/taguba/TAGUBA_REPORT_CERTIFICATIONS.pdf; see 
also Interview by Washington Media Associates with Maj. Gen. Thomas Romig (Nov. 19, 2007), 
available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv /torturingdemocracy/interviews/thomas_romig.html; 
infra Part III.D. 
 97. ICRC, supra note 72, at 17. 
 98. Davidson & Gibson, supra note 8, at 337. 
 99. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 5, June 18, 1977, 1124 U.N.T.S. 
609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. 
 100. ICRC, supra note 72, at 17. 
 101. See supra Part II.C (discussing non-international armed conflict that transcends 
borders). 
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outside of the zone of combat in Afghanistan and hold him or her in POW-like 
preventive detention.  If not, such U.S. conduct could constitute kidnapping.102 
Legally acceptable grounds for detention and how it may be imposed, 
challenged, or terminated during a non-international armed conflict are not 
specified under existing international law.103  However, international law is 
clear on the maximum possible length of legal detention and holds a uniform 
standard for international and non-international armed conflicts.  Detention or 
internment, whether of a combatant or civilian, ends with hostilities.104 
D.  Beyond Geneva: Other Law Informing U.S. Detention Practice 
Beyond the Geneva Conventions, other legal instruments shape U.S. practice 
of detention and the activities of its tribunals.  With relevance to interrogative 
detention, reinforcing the prohibition on coercion or intimidation in 
questioning POWs,105 the Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and 
                                                 
 102. U.S. legal opinion differs.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004) 
(stating that kidnapping and detention may not be a violation of international norms).  The U.S. 
government has extended the same argument regarding non-international armed conflict to assert 
the legality of targeted killing, outside of the Afghan theater.  If non-international armed conflict 
can transcend borders, then U.S. lethal drone attacks in Yemen, for example, may be incident to 
the war in Afghanistan and permitted under international law; if not, then U.S. drone attacks in 
Yemen may constitute murder or assassination, and are unlawful.  See generally Bill Roggio, US 
Drones Strike Again in Yemen, Killing 6 AQAP Fighters near Capital, THE LONG WAR JOURNAL 
(Jan. 23, 2013), www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/01/us_drones_strike_aga_5.php 
(reporting on recent drone strikes by the United States against al Qaeda fighters in Yemen and 
noting that “Obama administration officials have claimed . . . that the drones are targeting only [al 
Qaeda] leaders and operatives who pose a direct threat to the US homeland”).  The Bush and the 
Obama administrations rest their claims of legality on the AUMF.  Authorization for Use of 
Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)); 
see also Koh, supra note 33 (stating the Obama administration’s position that “a state that is 
engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with 
legal process before the state may use lethal force. . . . [U]nder domestic law, the use of lawful 
weapons systems—consistent with the applicable laws of war—for precision targeting of specific  
high-level belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not 
unlawful, and hence does not constitute ‘assassination.’”); Holder, supra note 74 (asserting that 
“legal” targeted killings during a borderless war are not assassinations). 
 103. ICRC, supra note 72, at 17. 
 104. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at arts. 85, 99, 129, 199; see also supra 
note 87. 
 105.  
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his 
surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial 
number, or failing this, equivalent information.  If he willfully infringes this rule, he 
may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or 
status.  
. . . 
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on 
prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of 
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Degrading Treatment (CAT), to which the United States is a party, erects an 
absolute bar to the practice of torture against detainees.106  The U.S. ban on 
torture is incorporated into U.S. law by statute.107 
However, Bush administration legal opinions blurred this bright-line 
renunciation of torture.  As set forth in the “Torture Memos” promulgated by 
Bush appointees to the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), 
the OLC introduced “specific intent” as an element of torture. 108   Thus, 
according to the OLC, inflicting pain on a detainee in U.S. custody would not 
amount to torture if the abuser’s intent was to extract information rather than to 
mistreat. 109   Although subsequent Bush administration OLC appointees 
withdrew the OLC legal opinion expressed in these “Torture Memos,” 110 
confusion persisted among front-line U.S. troops as to what standard was to 
guide treatment of detainees in their custody.111  Just one day after his first 
inauguration, President Obama officially renounced torture, repudiated the 
previous OLC decisions, and reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to 
Geneva Common Article 3 treatment for detainees.112 
                                                                                                                 
war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or 
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.  
. . . 
The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they 
understand. 
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69, at art. 17. 
 106. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 (entered into force 
June 26, 1987) [hereinafter CAT]; see also SENATE TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 5–14 (1988) 
(expressing the United States’ understanding of the CAT).  18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2006).  
Congress enacted §§ 2340–2340A to carry out the United States’ obligations under the CAT.  See 
H.R. REP. NO. 103-482, at 229 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 398, 472. 
 107. See supra note 106. 
 108. Torture Memo, supra note 95, at 3–4.  The OLC concluded that the statute’s specific 
intent requirement meant that inflicting severe pain or suffering be the defendant’s “precise 
objective,” and acting with knowledge that such pain “was reasonably likely to result from his 
actions” did not satisfy specific intent.  Id., repudiated by Memorandum from the Office of Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to the Deputy Att’y Gen. n.27 (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter 
Repudiation Memo] (“We do not reiterate that test here.”). 
 109. Torture Memo, supra note 95 (specifying conduct for interrogation that, per the OLC, 
would be considered legal under the statutory prohibition of torture). 
 110. Repudiation Memo, supra note 108, at n.27. 
 111. See infra Part III.D. 
 112. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 3 C.F.R. 199, 201 (2010) (“From this day forward, unless the 
Attorney General with appropriate consultation provides further guidance, officers, employees, 
and other agents of the United States Government may, in conducting interrogations, act in 
reliance upon Army Field Manual 2-22.3, but may not, in conducting interrogations, rely upon 
any interpretation of the law governing interrogation . . .  issued by the Department of Justice 
between September 11, 2001, and January 20, 2009.”); see also id., 3 C.F.R. 199, 200 (“Common 
Article 3 Standards as a Minimum Baseline.  Consistent with the requirements of the Federal 
torture statute, 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A, section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 
U.S.C. 2000dd, the Convention Against Torture, Common Article 3, and other laws regulating the 
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Another provision guiding the treatment of detainees taken into U.S. 
custody, Article 3 of the CAT, bars the United States from deporting any 
person to a country that would subject that person to torture.113  The CAT was 
formulated with the prevention of torture in mind, but has had the unintended 
effect of hampering the release of some Guantanamo detainees otherwise 
cleared by CSRTs or other tribunals, if deemed “more likely than not” to face 
mistreatment by their home government upon repatriation.114 
III.  CONCEPTUAL CONTOURS OF DETENTION 
Existing law and its gaps have informed U.S. experimentation with detention 
as a tactic in the fight against a non-state adversary since September 2001.  A 
wide variety of practices have been tried out in a relatively short time span; 
more careful reflection on detention, based on observation of actual practice by 
the executive branch, is overdue.  The discussion below is informed by the 
concept of the liminal phase, introduced by French social scientist Arnold van 
Gennep in his analysis of rites de passage.115  By rite de passage, van Gennep 
meant a ritual process that accompanies change of place, state, and social 
position such as a wedding, funeral, or, in terms of detention, a trial.116  Van 
Gennep identified three phases in a rite de passage: separation, liminality, and 
reattachment.117  The first and last phases “detach ritual subjects from their old 
places in society and return them, inwardly transformed and outwardly 
changed.”118  The middle, or liminal, phase is by definition located between 
                                                                                                                 
treatment and interrogation of individuals detained in any armed conflict, such persons shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely and shall not be subjected to violence to life and person 
(including murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture), nor to outrages upon 
personal dignity (including humiliating and degrading treatment), whenever such individuals are 
in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the 
United States Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a 
department or agency of the United States.”). 
 113. CAT, supra note 106, at art. 3.1 (prohibiting state parties from expelling, or refouling, 
any person to a state “where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture”). 
 114. United States Reservations to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, at II.(2) (Oct. 21, 1994),  
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV9&chapter=4&lang=
en# (“[T]he United States understands the phrase, ‘where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture,’ as used in article 3 of the 
Convention, to mean ‘if it is more likely than not that he would be tortured.’”). 
 115. ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE (Monika B. Vizedome & Gabrielle L. 
Caffee trans., Univ. Chi. Press 1960) (1909). 
 116. See id. 
 117. Victor Turner, Variations on a Theme of Liminality, in BLAZING THE TRAIL: WAY 
MARKS IN THE EXPLORATION OF SYMBOLS 48, 48 (Edith Turner ed., 1992) [hereinafter Turner, 
Variations]; see also Victor Turner, Morality and Liminality, in BLAZING THE TRAIL, supra, at 
132, 133 [hereinafter Turner, Morality] (discussing van Gennep’s work). 
 118. Turner, Variations, supra note 117, at 48–49. 
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established politico-jural states.119  Those in the liminal phase “evade ordinary 
cognitive classification, too, for they are not this or that, here or there, one 
thing or the other.”120  Liminal subjects exist in a state of potentiality. 
As illustration, consider ordinary criminal procedure as a right of passage: a 
crime occurs or is alleged to have occurred; an investigation identifies 
suspects; an accusation turns a “suspect” into an “accused;” a trial turns an 
“accused” into a person adjudged guilty or not guilty.  In this schematic, 
detention is a liminal state.  Conceptualizing detention as a liminal state allows 
for an analysis of its features under three categories of practice—criminal 
detention, preventive detention, and interrogative detention—that have 
emerged in the exercise of executive power since 9/11.  One particular 
institution—the tribunal—has come to play a key role in this rite de passage.  
“Tribunal” refers to a set of decision-makers more broad than military 
Commissions or formally constituted courts.  This Article uses “tribunal” to 
include any body convened to consider known facts, within categories set by 
law, to decide the disposition of a particular individual in the context of the 
United States’ war against al Qaeda and its allies.121  Detention does not start 
without a tribunal.  For example, a group of executive branch employees, 
normally functioning either in a military or intelligence capacity, is convened.  
They may work simultaneously together, as in a night raid or CVITs 
conference call, or consecutively and apart by drafting, revising, and signing 
off on memoranda to decide to subject a person to detention.  Tribunals initiate 
the liminal state of detention, detaching the liminal subject from a stable state.  
Do they play any further role?  The answer to this question depends on which 
kind of detention is at issue. 
A.  Criminal Detention 
Taking up criminal detention first, consider its primary goal: to bring 
someone to trial.  This common-sense point bears articulating because it stands 
in contrast to the other kinds of detention under consideration.  Stated 
conversely, trial is the one recognized legitimate purpose of criminal detention.  
Accusation casts a suspect into a liminal state, which a trial verdict terminates.  
For a person in the liminal status of “the accused,” a trial is the final step in a 
rite de passage for reattachment to a stable status.  “Reattachment” does not 
have to mean a return to the person’s former status, exonerated and free, 
restored to his or her former position in a social milieu.  “Reattachment” can 
also mean attachment to a stable social status that is new for the person 
undergoing the rite de passage.  The trial may end in an accused being 
pronounced guilty and incarcerated.  The new, stable social status is one of 
                                                 
 119. The liminal phase takes its name from the Latin term “limen,” literally meaning a 
“threshold.”  Id. at 49. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See generally Eppinger, supra note 7, at 1162–73 (providing a more in-depth 
consideration of the role of tribunals in the three modes of detention). 
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“convict,” and the new milieu is prison.  Military commissions serve the 
function of providing the exit process from the liminal state of detention—for 
ending the limbo—by rendering a verdict of “guilty” or “not guilty.”  Civilian 
criminal courts could serve the same function if Congress were to allow the 
executive to transfer criminally accused detainees held outside of the United 
States to stand trial in the United States. 
Whether bound for a trial by military commission trying war crimes or by a 
civilian criminal court, the goal of criminal detention is to hold suspects for 
trial.  Those concerned with it are occupied with procedures for achieving 
“fairness” at trial.  Even those unconcerned with protecting the civil liberties of 
suspected terrorists have an interest in fairness, acting in the belief that the 
criminal procedures devised to assure fair trials are also those that best allow 
the truth to emerge through an adversarial process.  In other words, “fairness” 
need not be an end in itself; it may serve a function in the production of truth, 
which then helps to assure that the government has “got the right guy,” a 
question of particular salience for those seeking to imprison conspirators in 
past or planned terrorist attacks.  Because of this concern with fairness and 
belief in a certain process (adversarial trial) for the production of truth (held 
even by those unsympathetic to detainees in U.S. custody), the emphasis by 
civil liberties advocates in the U.S. legal community on fair trials was not 
misguided per se.  It would, however, apply only to a small fraction of U.S. 
detainees, i.e., those intended for trial.122 
B.  Preventive Detention 
Criminal detention, where trial provides a clear exit to the liminal state of 
detention, has been the exceptional practice in war-on-terror detention.  In 
contrast to the small proportion of detainees held for criminal detention, some 
were treated more like traditional POWs, a situation in which detention is 
meant to render a combatant hors de combat.  For a side holding combatants it 
might otherwise face on a battlefield, the function served by detention in this 
case is prevention.123  Preventive detention is allowed, and even encouraged, 
under the international law of war.124  After all, the point of the law of war is to 
facilitate an end to hostilities in order to minimize suffering.125  Removing 
combatants from the battlefield was seen as a means to that end, and over the 
course of the twentieth century, international law developed techniques to 
                                                 
 122. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 123. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–20 (2004) (stating that at least one 
acceptable rationale for detaining lawful and unlawful combatants is to remove them from the 
battlefield and thus prevent their return to battle). 
 124. The Obama administration has referred to this as “law of war detention.”  See, e.g., 
Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 34. 
 125. See INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 4–5 
(Keith E. Puls ed., 2005) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK]. 
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guarantee the minimum living standards for those held as POWs, in part, to 
encourage surrender in international armed conflict. 
Several particular features complicate preventive detention in the present 
conflict.  First, whereas the laws of war for preventive detention during 
international armed conflict are well developed, regulation of detention in  
non-international armed conflict is an undeveloped area of international law,  
as outlined above. 126   The classification of the conflict in Afghanistan as 
international or non-international armed conflict is itself disputed.127  Given the 
different features of various war-fighting environments over the last decade of 
hostilities, the experience of U.S. soldiers and their detainees could differ 
widely between theaters.  Detainees in U.S. custody during the war in Iraq, an 
international armed conflict, might be held subject to a well-developed body  
of regulation. 128   Even with widely accepted regulations and systems for 
monitoring compliance in place, detainee treatment suffered.129  Detainees held 
as a result of the hostilities in Afghanistan, potentially categorized as a  
non-international armed conflict, lacked even that clarity.130 
Complicating matters further in this conflict is the potential for indefinite 
detention.131  The international law of war regulating preventive detention was 
not written with the possibility of endless war in mind.  In a typical 
international armed conflict, war as a formal legal state has a clear beginning 
with a state’s declaration of war and a clear end with its offer or acceptance of 
surrender.132  The current hostilities against al Qaeda are different.  The U.S. 
government adopted the position that hostilities could continue indefinitely 
and, therefore, preventive detention could also legally continue indefinitely.133  
The liminal state—the limbo status—could extend in perpetuity.  Even 
American citizens could be held by their government without charge in 
                                                 
 126. See supra Part II.C.; see also, e.g., Waxman, supra note 4, at 344–49. 
 127. See LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 84–86; see also supra notes 74–75 
and accompanying text. 
 128. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69. 
 129. See, e.g., TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 96.  Cf. Scott Shane, No Charges Filed in Two 
Deaths Involving C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/us/holder-rules-out-prosecutions-in-cia-interrogations.html? 
ref=abughraib (reporting the Justice Department’s decision not to prosecute intelligence or 
military personnel involved in the deaths of two prisoners in Afganistan and Iraq that were the 
result of torture and inhuman conditions). 
 130. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 69; LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 
84–86. 
 131. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519–21 (2004) (acknowledging the potential for 
indefinite detention in a theoretically indefinite war). 
 132. See, e.g., LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 4, 8–9. 
 133. U.N. Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 19 of the Convention, Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1999, 
Addendum (United States of America) Annex 1, at 47, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3 (May 6, 
2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/62175.pdf, cited in Waxman, 
supra note 4, at 344. 
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perpetuity if the U.S. government satisfies certain preconditions for preventive 
detention of citizens.134  The Supreme Court majority in Hamdi specified a few 
procedural guarantees to an American citizen detained pursuant to hostilities 
conducted under the auspices of Congress’s AUMF,135 but those guarantees 
should not obscure the bottom line on U.S. detention jurisprudence: Hamdi 
allows preventive detention for the duration of a conflict, following the 
established rule for POWs in international armed conflict, even in the case of a 
non-traditional conflict that could last indefinitely.136 
Non-Americans face an even grimmer reality, unaided by the Hamdi 
procedures for challenging categorization as an enemy combatant that extend 
only to the small category of American citizens.137  For non-Americans held in 
preventive detention at Guantanamo Bay, the Obama administration has 
instituted Periodic Review Boards (PRBs) to assess whether holding a detainee 
is “necessary to protect against a significant threat to the security of the United 
States.”138  At an initial PRB review hearing, each detainee has an opportunity 
to introduce additional information for the Board to weigh in determining 
whether the facts warrant continued preventive detention.139  Subsequently, 
Defense officials, with input from intelligence and other agencies, may 
compile additional information and revisit whether it justifies continued 
detention.140  This process highlights a new difference between criminal and 
preventive detention.  It tasks the Detaining Power with gathering evidence 
that could exculpate the “defendant.”  Unlike practitioners in the criminal law 
domain who seek to ascertain a fixed truth and convict or exonerate 
accordingly, practitioners in the national security domain deal in fleeting 
truths.  Their goal is to assess accurately the threat of a given moment and 
protect against it as effectively as possible, without wasting resources on 
                                                 
 134. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518–21 (recognizing the potential for indefinite detention under the 
executive branch’s authority to detain enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan under the 
auspices of the AUMF). 
 135. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)) (defining the scope of the hostilities broadly, 
stating that “the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons” responsible for 9/11).  Those guarantees are that the 
government provide an American-citizen detainee with: notice of a categorization like “enemy 
combatant” upon which detention is based; the chance to rebut that categorization; and a “neutral 
decision maker” to hear the challenge to the categorization.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. 
 136. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519–21 (noting the possibility of indefinite, or perpetual, preventive 
detention of American citizens apprehended in Afghanistan). 
 137. Id. at 532–34 (limiting the holding to a citizen detainee).  See also Boumediene v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723, 795–98 (2008) (holding that non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo may invoke the 
fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus in order to pursue review by a civilian judge 
of the detainee’s status as an enemy combatant, which, if upheld, justifies detention until the end 
of hostilities, per President Bush’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002)). 
 138. Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 34. 
 139. Id. § 3(a). 
 140. Id. § 3(a)(4). 
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bygones and has-beens.  Risk—not retribution or justice—figures prominently 
in the rationale.  Temporality is key.  Preventive detention makes sense only 
against a present or future instigator of harm.  However, under the present 
scheme, resources are not expended in continuous reassessment.  A PRB 
conducts an initial review hearing to assess whether continued detention of a 
Guantanamo detainee meets the standard of protecting the United States 
against a significant threat, at that moment.  While the risk that a particular 
detainee poses will change with rapidly changing facts on the ground, as well 
as the detainees own capacities and intentions, the PRB does not conduct 
another full hearing to assess the threat posed by the detainee for three more 
years.  Between triennial hearings, the PRB merely reviews the detainee’s file 
twice per year.141 
Some information about review of the continued preventive detention at 
Guantanamo Bay has come into the public domain since the Obama 
administration formalized and published the procedures.142  Far less is known 
about review of preventive detention at the DFIP facility in Afghanistan, where 
the United States holds many more detainees.143  Some public information 
comes from court filings in Bagram detainee habeas actions.144  An Enemy 
Combatant Review Board, a five-officer panel, reviews the case of each person 
brought to the DFIP for long-term confinement and decides by majority vote 
whether the detainee should be held.145  Continued detention is reviewed every 
six months as at Guantanamo Bay. 146   Matthew Waxman, a former Bush 
administration Department of Defense official with some purview over 
detainee affairs, writes: “[T]he processes US forces eventually put in place [in 
Afghanistan] roughly track the requirements of [the Fourth Geneva 
Convention] Article 78, which calls for, among other things, regular processes 
and periodic review (at least every six months) for security internees.”147 
                                                 
 141. See id. § 3(b)–(c).  The biannual review interval  meets the Fourth Geneva Convention’s 
standard for review of continued internment of a civilian during armed conflict.  Fourth Geneva 
Convention, supra note 69, at art. 78. 
 142. Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 34, § 3 (explaining the detainee review process). 
 143. Waxman, supra note 4, at 350 (providing information on Bagram review procedures 
used after 2006; those used before this period are even murkier). 
 144. See id. at 350 & 356 n.41 (citing Declaration of Colonel James W. Gray ¶¶ 11–13, Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-CV-01669 (D.D.C. 2007) (discussing the review process for detainees 
in Afghanistan); Declaration of Colonel Rose M. Miller ¶¶ 10–12, Ruzatullah v. Rumsfeld, No. 
06-C-01707 (D.D.C. 2006) (discussing detention procedures and the review process for enemy 
combatants detained in Afghanistan)); see also Monica Eppinger, Military Tribunals: A Critical 
Assessment, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1153, 1170–71 (2012).   
 145. See, e.g., Eppinger, supra note 144, at 1170–71 (“Each individual brought to theater 
detention facilities for long-term confinement has his case reviewed by an Enemy Combatant 
Review Board, a five-officer panel that recommends by majority vote whether the detainee be 
held in continued detention.  We can infer that each person’s continued detention is reviewed 
once every six months. . . .”).   
 146. See Waxman, supra note 4, at 350. 
 147. Id. 
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The agreement between the United States and Afghanistan over the transfer 
of the Parwan facility left two issues unresolved that illustrate gaps in 
international law regulating preventive detention.  The first issue concerns 
third-country detainees.  The MOU explicitly limits the transfer of detainees to 
“Afghan nationals.”148   During an August 5, 2010 news conference, Vice 
Admiral Robert Harward indicated that the United States would retain 
decisional authority over non-Afghan detainees, stating, “[o]ur first preference 
is to repatriate them back to their host countries; if not, prosecute them in the 
Afghan legal system.”149  Although Admiral Harward would not provide a 
precise number of third-country detainees, he indicated that “there [were] less 
than 50 [and that] [s]eventy-five percent come from Pakistan.” 150   The  
non-governmental organization Human Rights First estimates that there are 
forty-one third-country non-Afghan detainees at the DFIP.151  In January 2012, 
the United States was reportedly considering repatriation of the  
third-country detainees in anticipation of Afghan authorities lacking interest  
in practicing criminal or national security detention in their cases.152  The 
ongoing interplay between risk calculations and desire to comport with treaty 
obligations, both part of the ethical formulation of national security 
practitioners, is evident: repatriation of third-country DFIP detainees is 
apparently predicated on successfully negotiating post-transfer monitoring and 
on securing diplomatic assurances that “detainees will not be abused when they 
return home.”153 
The second unresolved issue concerns decisional authority over detainee 
release.  The MOU requires the government of Afghanistan to “consider 
favorably” any U.S. assessments that a detainee should not be released.154  
There is some question as to whether this gives the United States a de  
facto veto over Afghan release decisions.155  The U.S. government reportedly 
believes that it can block the release of detainees as long as its forces are in 
                                                 
 148. MOU, supra note 49, at para. 4. 
 149. Admiral Harward is the Commander of Joint Task Force-435, which operates the DFIP.  
See DOD News Briefing with Vice Adm. Harward and Ambassador Klemm from Afghanistan, 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript 
.aspx?transcriptid=53002 [hereinafter DOD News Briefing]. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, DETAINED AND DENIED IN AFGHANISTAN: HOW TO MAKE 
U.S. DETENTION COMPLY WITH THE LAW 3 (2011). 
 152. Peter Finn & Julie Tate, Some Held at U.S.-Run Prison in Afghanistan Could Return 
Home, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2012, at A11. (“Afghan authorities are unlikely to have any interest 
in either continuing to hold [them] or [in] putting them on trial”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. MOU, supra note 49, at para. 9. 
 155. Rod Nordland, Detainees Are Handed over to Afghans, But Not out of Americans’ 
Reach, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A4 (“When asked whether that structure basically gave the 
Americans veto power on detainees releases, the [U.S.] official said, ‘That’s your word, not 
mine.’”). 
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Afghanistan.156  Alternatively, the Afghan DFIP commander does not believe 
that such a veto exists, as it would undermine Afghan sovereignty.157  The 
ambiguity may be intentionally embedded.  One U.S. official stated that the 
MOU was written thus “‘because the U.S. in Kabul is speaking to two 
audiences with contradictory interests: Congress, which does not want 
Afghanistan to release anybody they want, and the Afghans, who want 
sovereignty.’”158 
C.  Interrogative Detention 
In a war in which detention has been so widely practiced, three motivating 
logics have emerged.  Prosecution is dwarfed in comparison with prevention in 
both frequency and prominence.  The widespread practice of preventive 
detention during this series of conflicts is consistent with twentieth-century 
experience in conventional war, although its importance as a war-fighting 
doctrine against “insurgency” and in war against non-state actors may have 
grown.  What emerged in a new way during the “war on terror” was detention 
motivated by the prospect of gathering intelligence interrogative detention.  
Although certainly present in U.S. practices of detention in past conflicts, 
interrogative detention became prevalent—and in some manifestations, more 
openly acknowledged in this conflict than in any other since the 1929 Geneva 
Conventions.159 
One reason stems from the inception of the war and the nature of the foe.  
9/11 was diagnosed, in part, as a failure of intelligence, and the executive 
branch intelligence agencies sought to remedy that failure, in part, by gathering 
as much intelligence as possible.160  The executive branch pursued individuals 
for interrogative detention in two different ways, in service of two different 
ends.  First, after the surprise attacks of 9/11, the U.S. government and its allies 
reacted as if to a great crime scene, detaining many individuals, the equivalent 
of material witnesses detained for what they were expected to know. 161  
                                                 
 156. Id. (“‘Absolutely we have veto power.’”). 
 157. Id. (stating that Afghan General Ghulam Farouq insisted that the United States did not 
hold veto power). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention of 1929) 
(July 27, 1929) art. 5 (besides name and rank, stating that “no pressure shall be exercised on 
prisoners to obtain information regarding the situation in their armed forces or their country”). 
 160. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT (2011), available at http://www.9-11commission. 
gov/report/911Report.pdf. 
 161. In at least one case, a detainee was originally held—literally—as a material witness.  
American citizen Jose Padilla was held as a material witness for the grand jury investigation into 
the 9/11 attacks from his detention at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport on May 8, 2002, until his 
designation as an “enemy combatant” and transfer to a U.S. military detention facility on June 9, 
2002.  Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 386, 390 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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Specific individuals were identified, sought, detained, and interrogated. 162  
Although itself a matter of controversy, the practice of seeking information 
from war detainees was seen by some as an extension of accepted practice.  
The Department of Defense designated the Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, as a “strategic intelligence gathering center.”163  It instructed Combatant 
Commanders performing war-on-terror missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, or 
elsewhere not to view Guantanamo as a destination for those whom Combatant 
Commanders apprehended but considered “low-level Enemy Combatants who 
pose only a tactical force protection threat;” instead, the Guantano facility was 
intended for detainees considered to be of “high operational or strategic 
intelligence or law enforcement value.” 164   The Department of Defense 
developed extensive guidelines outlining the division of labor between guards, 
military police, and interrogators at Guantanamo; even specifying conduct  
by interpreters thought to facilitate intelligence gathering.165  Reviews were 
conducted to monitor that actual practice followed guidance.166 
                                                 
 162. The U.S. policy of seeking highly valued targets for intelligence gathering—formerly 
referred to as high payoff targets (HPTs)—predates the “war on terror.”  See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE 
ARMY, FIELD MANUAL FM 34-52 INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION 1-7 to 1-15 (1992), available 
at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/additional_detainee_documents 
/07-F-2406%20doc%2010.pdf.  The U.S. military developed and vetted those interrogation 
techniques in an attempt to meet Geneva and other law-of-war standards as well as the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).  Id. 
 163. See Memorandum from Office of Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Special Operations/Low 
Intensity Conflict (ASDSO/LIC), Criteria and Guidelines for Screening and Processing Persons 
Detained by the Department of Defense in Connection with the War on Terror (Aug. 22, 2003), at 
3 [hereinafter Criteria and Guidelines Memo], available at http://www.dod.mil/ 
pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/04-F-0269%20Criteria%20and%20Guidelines%20for%2 
0Screening%20and%20Processing%20Persons%20Detained%20by%20the%20DoD%20in%20C
onnection%20with%20the%20War%20on%20Terrorism.pdf.  The Memorandum was 
promulgated, for example, by cable to field command and detention facility commanders in Cable 
632132 from the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Memorandum on Criteria and Guidelines for 
Screening and Processing Persons Detained by the DOD in Connection with the War on 
Terrorism (Mar. 3, 2004), at para. III.G, available at 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/04-F-0269%20Global%20Screening 
%20Guidance.pdf. 
 164. See supra note 162. 
 165. JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO (JTF-GTMO), CAMP DELTA STANDARD OPERATING 
PROCEDURES sec. 4-20, at 4.3 (2003) [hereinafter GTMO SOP], available at 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/CampDeltaSOP_dec07.pdf (“The 
purpose of the Behavior Management Plan is to enhance and exploit the disorientation and 
disorganization felt by a newly arrived detainee in the interrogation process.”); id. sec. 15-10, at 
15.5; id. sec. 15-11, at 15.5 (allowing interpreters to loiter in cell blocks outside of interrogation 
sessions and to make observations of such detainee behavior as “reverence toward other 
detainees,” “cheering,” “teachers,” and to report observations to the Joint Detention Operations 
Group). 
 166. See, e.g., VICE ADMIRAL A.T. CHURCH III, USN & BRIGADIER GEN. D.D. THIESSEN, 
USMC, BRIEF TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS 
DETAINED AT NAVAL STATION GUANTANÁMO BAY, CUBA, AND NAVAL CONSOLIDATED BRIG 
CHARLESTON (2004) [hereinafter SEC. DEF. BRIEFING], available at http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi 
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Although the bureaucratization of procedures and safeguards may promote 
the sense that interrogative detention of “high value detainees” in the “war on 
terror” amounts merely to the extension of prior military practice, other 
disclosures bar that conclusion.  In this conflict, the U.S. government took the 
policy of seeking highly valued sources to new lengths.  As one example, the 
U.S. government devised procedures for “extraordinary rendition”: assumedly 
to avoid de jure violation of U.S. domestic and treaty law prohibitions on 
physical or psychological harm of detainees in its custody, the U.S. 
government targeted and seized persons it believed to have knowledge or 
information of national security significance and delivered those individuals to 
cooperative governments known to practice torture.167  One credible source 
documented that at least 136 persons had thus been “rendered” by 
 the U.S. government for torture. 168   At least two cases involved gross 
misidentification—one, a case of mistaken identity,169 and another, a case of an 
innocent Canadian wrongfully characterized as having terrorist  
affiliations170—resulting in the torture of men who had no information to 
share.  Civil suits or government inquiries have won compensation for some 
who were rendered and survived, though all such suits in the United States 
have been dismissed by the courts on procedural grounds such as state secrets 
privilege or judicial deference to the executive in matters of foreign policy.171  
                                                                                                                 
/operation_and_plans/Detainee/may04church_secdef.pdf; Memorandum from Admiral J. 
Stavridis, U.S. Navy to Mr. Uldric L. Fiore, Jr., Assistant Inspector Gen. & Gen. Counsel, Office 
of the Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Def. (Feb. 5, 2007), available  
at http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/09-F-0049_BassettReport.pdf 
(detailing an investigation of allegations of detainee abuse stemming from off-duty bragging by 
Guantanamo personnel and finding no serious violations of procedure). 
 167. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary 
Rendition” Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106 (providing an early report of 
“extraordinary rendition”). 
 168. OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, GLOBALIZING TORTURE: CIA SECRET DETENTION 
AND EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 6 (2013), available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org 
/sites/default/files/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf. 
 169. See Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 4, 2005, at A1 (discussing the imprisonment of German citizen Khaled el Masri); see also 
Case of El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Eur. Ct. H.R., Application No. 
39630/09, para. 205 (Dec. 13, 2012) (“The Court observes that on 23 January 2004 the applicant, 
handcuffed and blindfolded . . . and subjected to total sensory deprivation . . . was forcibly 
marched to a CIA aircraft.”), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages 
/search.aspx?i=001=115621. 
 170. See Mayer, supra note 167, at 106 (discussing the case of Canadian citizen Maher Arar); 
see also CANADIAN GOV’T COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN 
RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT ON THE EVENTS RELATED TO MAHER ARAR 9–10 (2006). 
 171. There are examples of successful civil suits in foreign courts or foreign governmental 
inquiries resulting in compensation.  See, e.g., Case of El-Masri, supra note 169; Press Release, 
Office of Prime Minister of Can., Prime Minister Releases Letter of Apology to Maher Arar and 
His Family and Announces Completion of Mediation Process (Jan. 26, 2007), available at 
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1509 (announcing that the Canadian government had issued an 
official apology and C$10.5 million plus legal costs in compensation to Arar, arising from the 
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Only in Italy have criminal prosecutions been brought against U.S. officials for 
kidnapping in connection with extraordinary rendition, resulting in convictions 
against all accused.172 
In addition to extraordinary rendition, credible sources also report another 
extreme departure from past practice under the Bush administration’s conduct 
of interrogative detention, namely the U.S. government’s setting up so-called 
“Black Sites,” secret facilities established for the interrogative detention of 
certain “high-value detainees.”173  Assumedly, these sites were not operated on 
U.S. soil. 174   They likely involved U.S. personnel as interrogators.  U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
Canadian government’s information-sharing with U.S. intelligence agencies and thus the 
Canadian government’s complicity with his rendition).  U.S. courts have dismissed suits seeking 
redress for U.S. government renditions.  See El-Masri v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 541 
(E.D. Va. 2006) (granting motion to dismiss on an assertion of the state secrets privilege), aff’d, 
479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (dismissing on several grounds), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated and aff’d en 
banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 172. The Italian case involved the seizure of Nasr Osama Mustafa Hassan (known as Abu 
Omar), an Egyptian cleric who had been granted political asylum in Italy.  Abu Omar was seized 
on the street in Milan while walking to his mosque, brought to the U.S. airbase in Aviano, flown 
to Ramstein, Germany, and thence to Cairo, Egypt, where he alleges he was tortured at an 
Egyptian facility.  In 2009, an Italian court convicted, in absentia, twenty-three U.S. officials of 
Abu Omar’s kidnapping, including Milan CIA station chief Robert Seldon Lady.  For summary 
and analysis, see Tribunale de Milano (sez. IV pen.) 1° febbraio 2010 n. 12428, on International 
Law in Domestic Courts, OUP Reference: ILDC 1492 (IT 2010).  Three other U.S.  
officials—CIA Rome station chief Jeffrey Castelli and CIA agents operating under diplomatic 
cover as First Secretary and Second Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Rome—were acquitted at 
the 2009 trial, but only because they asserted diplomatic immunity.  The convictions of the 
twenty-three Americans were upheld on appeal before Italy’s highest court in 2012, and their 
sentences were increased (from seven to nine years in the case of Milan station chief Robert 
Seldon Lady, and from five to seven years in the cases of the other twenty-two).  See Timothy 
Synhaeve, Taking the War on Terror to Court: A Legal Analysis on the Right to Reparation for 
Victims of Extraordinary Rendition, 5 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L. 439, 469–72 (2011) (describing 
procedural maneuvering over state the secrets privilege in the original trial).  Due to a 
technicality, the Italian government will not seek extradition of any of the convicted. 
On February 4, 2013, an appeals court vacated the acquittals of the other three who had 
claimed diplomatic immunity in 2009, convicting and sentencing Rome station chief Jeffrey 
Castelli to seven years and Americans Betnie Madero and Ralph Russomando to six years each.  
See Italian Court Convicts Three Americans in Kidnapping Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2013, at 
A6; see also Elisabetta Povoledo, High Court in Italy Backs Convictions for Rendition, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2012, at A5.  The Italian court’s convictions are the only criminal prosecutions 
to date for rendition.  For an overview and summary of all twenty-six convictions, see Colleen 
Barry, Milan Court Convicts Three Americans in CIA Kidnapping, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 3 
2013, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202586754294.  The convictions in the Italian 
court are the only convictions of U.S. officials in connection with rendition, as yet. 
 173. See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 168, at 15–16 (“President Bush has 
stated that about a hundred detainees were held under the CIA secret detention program.”). 
 174. However, details regarding the detention of a very small number of people at the Naval 
Consolidated Brig in Charleston, South Carolina, are hazy.  See SEC. DEF. BRIEFING, supra note 
166, at 15 (noting the “limited detainee population”).  Not all identities, beyond now-convicted 
criminal Jose Padilla, of those held in interrogative detention at Charleston are available.  See 
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government officials made extensive efforts to enlist the assistance of foreign 
governments, and in the end, fifty-four foreign governments have been 
documented as helping the U.S. government in carrying out extraordinary 
rendition or in operating “Black Sites.”175 
The practice of targeting particular sources thought to be especially 
knowledgeable for capture and interrogative detention was pronounced at the 
outset of hostilities and in the early years of war.  Over a longer span, an 
increasing number of al Qaeda leadership had been taken into custody and 
were already held; killed in the course of hostilities; or captured, interrogated, 
and released.  The usefulness of supposed knowledge waned with its 
timeliness.  As war thinned the ranks of the operational leadership of the 
earlier organization, new recruits may have been operating as sympathetic 
bands rather than closely integrated affiliates.  Information about the methods 
used to target particular sources gradually became public, and as such 
information spread, the public—or some subsections of it—began to object.176  
Some foreign prosecutors secured convictions of U.S. officials.177  During the 
2008 presidential campaign, then-Senator Obama campaigned against torture, 
and when President Obama took office in 2009, his administration renounced it 
as a matter of policy, and with it, rendition. 178   Likewise, the Obama 
administration ordered the CIA to close any detention facilities it was 
operating, i.e., the “Black Sites.”179 
Extreme measures involving high-value targets, although significant as 
indicators of the lengths the executive has gone to illicit information through 
detention, do not demonstrate its breadth.  Targeting “high-value” individuals 
represents only a fraction of the interrogative detention practiced; although the 
United States has reduced the practice, a second way of pursuing sources of 
possible information, in service of a different kind of end, has come to the fore: 
                                                                                                                 
OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 168, at 5–6; Abby Goodnough & Scott Shane, 
Padilla Is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at A1 (reporting 
that Padilla was held in the South Carolina brig in isolation for three and a half years).  The use of 
the Charleston facility for interrogative detention that was not, as far as publicly available sources 
reveal, detention primarily for preventive or prosecutorial purposes; and the extent to which the 
government has shielded in secrecy its methods of interrogation, the agencies involved, and other 
details usually public regarding publicly funded institutions in the United States leads to 
speculation about whether to categorize Charleston as the only U.S.-based “Black Site.”  See SEC. 
DEF. BRIEFING, supra note 166, at 15–16 (mentioning Charleston interrogative detention). 
 175. See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 168, at 6. 
 176. For examples of information becoming more widely available, see OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE, supra note 168, at 29–30 (providing information that was released or uncovered 
about detainees subjected to post-9/11 secret detention and extraordinary rendition).  See also 
Mayer, supra note 167, at 106–08; Priest, supra note 169, at A25. 
 177. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 178. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 3 C.F.R. 199, 201 (2009).  Critics contend that the Obama 
administration policy now is merely to kill suspected terrorists instead of rounding them up for 
interrogation. 
 179. Id. 
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interrogative detention as mass practice.  Detention in the “war on terror” has 
become particularly widespread because of an epistemological shift in the 
production of intelligence. 
Intelligence analysts now construct a picture of the threat environment, as 
one court described, by fitting “thousands of bits and pieces of seemingly 
innocuous information . . . into place to reveal with startling clarity how the 
unseen whole must operate.”180  With this “mosaic theory” of intelligence, 
where the goal of those conducting the inquiry and investigation is to amass 
enough small bits of information to piece together a broader picture of the 
threats ahead or the perpetrators behind, a detainee might not even be aware 
that he or she knows something useful, or know what to divulge were he or she 
inclined to facilitate the process. 181   This departs from both the “grand 
criminal” (or war criminal) model and the high-value detainee model.  Under 
the logic of this process, a “useful” detainee, i.e., one with information within 
the scope of relevance, may be held for questioning, even if not a criminal 
suspect, and, under a standard of a wide scope of relevance, the greater the 
number of detainees, the more sources of mosaic bits, and the more full the 
picture composed.182 
In a news briefing, Admiral Harward provided a picture of the approach to 
mosaic composition, describing the information U.S. officials seek to obtain 
from detainees as follows: 
Q: Can you tell us what information you routinely seek from 
detained, suspected insurgents about where—the source of their 
money and what they intend to do with it? 
ADM. HARWARD: Well, I would tell you this, I wouldn’t want to 
give exactly the information we’re after. 
But we talk to every individual detained, through all portions of the 
life cycle, not only to identify funding sources, but also ties, and—be 
it in government, be it in the insurgency and all other—all other 
connections they have, to understand the human terrain and how it 
functions here in Afghanistan. 
                                                 
 180. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 181. Id. (likening foreign intelligence gathering in an age of computer technology to the 
construction of a mosaic).  The Department of the Navy, in its Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) regulations, thus defines the theory as “[t]he concept that apparently harmless pieces of 
information when assembled together could reveal a damaging picture.”  32 C.F.R. § 701.31 
(2005); David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information 
Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 651–52 (2005) (detailing how national security information has become 
so heterogeneous that “we increasingly do not know what information matters, or who has it, or 
how to control it”). 
 182. See McLoughlin et al., supra note 8, at 476–77 (explaining the concept of preventive 
detention and how some detainees are in fact criminals while “others may not have been accused 
of crimes”). 
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Q: Are you receiving enough of that information as part of the 
detainee interview process, or are you trying to get more? 
ADM. HARWARD: Well, we use all modes of intelligence to gather 
that information.  Our strength is having a large population we have 
access to, that we can spend a lot of time talking to, and gaining 
more fidelity on how those systems and those individuals interact 
and how they function.183 
In debates over interrogation in the “war on terror,” much has been made of 
the “ticking time bomb,” a situation where gaining information about a 
pending attack is of the utmost urgency.  The perceived nature of the adversary 
may have at least as great an influence as instances of perceived urgency have 
on the spread of interrogative detention.  In other words, states may perceive 
an even greater incentive to practice interrogative detention against a non-state 
global adversary such as al Qaeda.  Unlike the adversary in a traditional 
international armed conflict between states, in this conflict, the adversary does 
not sit in a capital, with the fixed assets (and penetrable systems) of an 
intelligence headquarters, National Security Council, or Politburo; the 
“headquarters” of an adversary like al Qaeda might be located in something as 
nimble and malleable as a laptop.184  Facing a flexible and fluid adversary, 
human sources of information about networks, redundancies, motivations, and 
strategies become even more significant for discerning the enemy.185 
Against this background of heightened demand for interrogative detention, a 
lack of clarity surrounds international legal standards regarding interrogative 
detention.186  In fact, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the 
organization of experts who are guardians and promulgators of the 
international law of war, and some of the states party to the Geneva 
Conventions express reluctance to augment laws of war to regulate 
interrogation.187  Perhaps the ICRC does not want to make any additions to the 
international law of detention that could blur the bright-line prohibition of 
torture.188 
Interrogative detention is a practice area marked by several features.  One is 
scant regulation in international law (besides the bright-line prohibition against 
                                                 
 183. DOD News Briefing, supra note 149. 
 184. See Jayshree Bajoria & Greg Bruno, al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al-Qaida, al-Qa’ida), COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations/al-qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaida/p9126 
(last updated June 6, 2012). 
 185. See Pozen, supra note 181, at 651–52. 
 186. See, e.g., ICRC Background Document, supra note 11, at 4–6. 
 187. See id. at 5–6 (discussing a planned resolution for the 2011 Quadrennial Review to 
ensure better legal protection of persons detained for security reasons during non-international 
armed conflicts, but expressing the reservation of some States of the need to develop new treaty 
rules). 
 188. CAT, supra note 106. 
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torture) and thus the absence of legal liability for violating regulatory norms.189  
Another, a matter more of policy than of law, is an absence of procedures for 
evaluating the utility of interrogation and procedures for terminating the 
detention.190  Under a mosaic theory of intelligence, the executive branch has a 
continued incentive to keep a detainee in custody, even if the detainee has no 
further apparent value for intelligence; for example, after his or her 
operationally significant knowledge would have been overtaken by events on 
the ground. 191   This is because, under a mosaic theory of intelligence 
collection, a detainee might have some background knowledge that could 
provide “missing piece” details to a larger picture that the intelligence 
community is trying to assemble.192 
D.  The Bleed 
Distinguishing between modes of detention provides conceptual clarity, but 
one should recognize that, in practice, executive branch authorities do not 
always keep these modes distinct from one another.193  Authorities may take a 
detainee into custody for one purpose but continue detention for a different 
purpose,194 or they may leverage the different modes of detention to coerce 
detainee cooperation.195 
For example, three months after the inception of the war in Afghanistan and 
fifteen months before the war in Iraq, the Bush administration had formulated a 
plan to leverage the liminal state in order to encourage cooperation by 
detainees in U.S. custody.196  The idea was to encourage detainees to provide 
                                                 
 189. See Freedman, supra note 9, at 329–39 (opining that, because international human rights 
law for security detention is derived from many different texts, the regulations are vague, 
uncertain, or inconsistent). 
 190. For a concurring view, see Davison & Gibson, supra note 8, at 326–27, 371–72. 
 191. For commentary on this practice, see Ryan Goodman, Rationales for Detention: 
Security Threats and Intelligence Value, 85 INT’L L. STUD. 373, 375–79 (2009) (critiquing the 
recent trend of using security detainees for information gathering purposes, even though such 
practice conflicts with international human rights law). See also Pozen, supra note 181, at  
630–31. 
 192. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Criteria and Guidelines Memo, supra note 163, sec. 4, at 3 (directing combatant 
commanders to assess all those over whom he or she gains control for threat to the United States, 
for high operational or strategic intelligence, or for law enforcement value to the United States; a 
detainee could fit within any, all, or none of the categories). 
 194. See Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending 
Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 367–68 (2001) 
(statement of ACLU, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Dep’t of Justice Oversight Hearing]. 
 195. See, e.g., GTMO SOP, supra note 165, sec. 29-1 (specifying procedures for moving a 
detainee between blocks within the Guantanamo facility of greater or lesser deprivation and 
strictness as part of the bureaucratization of leveraging differing standards of treatment to induce 
detainee cooperation with interrogation and other matters). 
 196. The plan outlined in this paragraph was explained in a telephone interview with  
former Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Pierre-Richard Prosper.  See Interview with 
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information by allowing a prisoner to “graduate” from one level to another: 
“Level 1” included high-level threats, meant to be tried by military 
commissions for war crimes; “Level 2” were mid-level threats, deemed to 
warrant detention and monitoring; and “Level 3” delineated low-level 
individuals who could be released.197  This plan depended on the prospect of 
indefinite extension of the liminal state as a negative incentive.  Note too that 
designation as a criminal or war-crimes suspect depended as much upon 
assessment of cooperation and future threat as measurement of past criminal 
acts; the scheme for Guantanamo depended on a conflation of preventive 
detention, interrogative detention, and criminal detention.  As the prosecutions 
before the military commission were delayed by several years of litigation over 
their procedures, however, the Bush administration’s plan unraveled.198 
Engaging in different modes of detention, which entail different purposes, 
motivations, and practices, under one general umbrella concept can engender 
misrecognition, confusion, inappropriate conduct, or illegal detainee 
treatment.199  At the Abu Ghraib facility in Iraq, for example, abuse started 
with confusion.  After its invasion of Iraq, the United States used Abu Ghraib 
for criminal detention, preventive detention, and interrogative detention.200  Six 
months after the invasion and start of occupation, Major General Miller, the 
commander who had overseen operations involving “high-value detainee” 
interrogations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, arrived in Iraq to assess U.S. 
interrogation operations there and to make proposals for improvement. 201  
Miller drew a distinction between tactical interrogation operations (meant to 
elicit information useful in day-to-day war-fighting) and strategic interrogation 
                                                                                                                 
the Honorable Pierre-Richard Prosper, supra note 44; see also Dep’t of Justice Oversight 
Hearing, supra note 194, at 139–41 (statement of Ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee).  The hearings were conducted to examine the constitutional and 
legal implications of the President’s executive order to establish military commissions with 
respect to the detention, treatment, and trial of persons accused of terrorist activities.  Id. 
 197. See GTMO SOP, supra note 165, for procedures; see also Telephone Interview with  
The Honorable Pierre-Richard Prosper, supra note 44. (“Detainees could move from level 1 to 
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 198. Telephone Interview with the Honorable Pierre-Richard Prosper, supra note 44.  See 
generally ELSEA & GARCIA, supra note 14. 
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measurable outcomes, see Benjamin Lee Whorf, The Relation of Habitual Thought and 
Behaviour to Language, in LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 64, 65–66 (Ben G. Blount ed., 
1995). 
 200. TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 96, at 10. 
 201. Major General Geoffrey Miller arrived with a team of interrogation and detention 
experts from Guantanamo on August 31, 2003, on a ten-day mission.  MG GEOFFREY MILLER, 
ASSESSMENT OF DOD COUNTERTERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN 
IRAQ (U) 2 (2003) [hereinafter MILLER ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs 
/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/taguba/ANNEX_020_MG_MILLER_REPORT.pdf. 
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operations (to yield information about the organization, capabilities, and plans 
of al Qaeda and others threatening attacks against the United States).  
Transition to a new phase of operations in Iraq entailed an epistemological 
shift, in Miller’s Assessment: “transition to strategic interrogation 
operations.”202  Although Army regulations and a different recent review of 
detention operations (the Ryder Report) specified that “military police ‘do not 
participate in military intelligence [MI] supervised interrogations,’” Miller’s 
team recommended that the “‘guard force’ be actively engaged in setting the 
conditions for successful exploitation of the internees.”203  The Taguba Report 
objects that misrecognition marks the Miller Team’s read of the situation and 
that the Miller Assessment intentionally, but wrongly, extended Guantanamo 
interrogative detention procedures.204  Procedures that might be considered 
appropriate in a facility with an emphasis on interrogative detention could be 
inappropriate elsewhere.  Certainly, Taguba suggests, lower-ranking guards 
might have read the Miller Assessment recommendations as new or conflicting 
guidance: “While clearly the 800th MP Brigade and its commanders were not 
tasked to set conditions for detainees for subsequent MI (military intelligence) 
interrogations, it is obvious . . . this was done at lower levels.”205  Shortly after 
Major General Miller’s recommendations were issued and promulgated, some 
numbers of the Military Police brigade guarding detainees at Abu Ghraib 
engaged in “incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses” against 
those in their custody.206  Division of labor, training, and professionalization 
were called on as solutions to problems inhering to crossover motivations and 
practices resulting from a bleed between categories of detention and conduct 
considered more or less appropriate to each. 
Information revealed in recent court records shows that the Obama 
administration has sought to leverage differences between types of detention in 
a different manner than the Bush administration had.  For example, authorities 
conduct one set of interview procedures that do not include reading a detainee 
his Miranda rights, a so-called “dirty interview,” which is meant to extract the 
maximum amount of actionable intelligence from a detainee, before turning the 
detainee over to a different set of questioners who observe the protocols 
                                                 
 202. Id. at 4. 
 203. TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 96, at 9. 
 204. Id. at 8 (“MG Miller’s team recognized that they were using JTF-GTMO operational 
procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines for its observations and recommendations.  
There is a strong argument that the intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo 
(GTMO) is different than that of detainees held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF),” which includes a large 
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about international terrorist organizations). 
 205. Id. at 12. 
 206. Id. at 16.  Note that although the Taguba Report condemns the abuse and sanctions by 
those it finds responsible, it does not challenge coercive interrogation as a practice.  The message 
is, rather, to train some for work in preventive and criminal detention and to leave interrogation to 
the experts. 
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necessary to produce evidence admissible at trial, a so-called “clean 
interview.” 207   The admissibility of evidence from a clean interview is 
currently being litigated in federal court.208 
IV.  CONCLUDING PROPOSALS 
A.  Criminal Detention 
The handful of detainees categorized as criminal suspects should be bound 
for prosecution.  To deal with those held in criminal detention, a robust set of 
alternatives already exists.  Violations of U.S. criminal law can be tried in U.S. 
civilian court, 209  and using the courts to adjudicate these cases arguably 
strengthens the rule of law in the United States by using the judiciary for one 
of its constitutionally specified functions.  A proposal in the 112th Congress to 
preclude foreign terrorists’ prosecutions in U.S.-based civilian courts210 runs 
directly against the intention of the Bush administration when President Bush 
originally authorized military commissions for terrorist suspects in November 
2001.211  Ambassador Pierre Prosper, the Bush administration’s representative 
to a December 4, 2001, Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, stated clearly that 
the administration’s position was to add military tribunals to the civilian court 
system, in other words, add, not subtract, prosecutorial options for the 
executive branch.212  The Obama administration has also made clear that it 
                                                 
 207. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Hearing on Terror Suspect Explores Miranda Warning, N.Y 
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at A31. 
 208. For a description of “dirty” and “clean” interviews, see generally Sealed Indictment, 
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Senator SESSIONS. . . . If [the President] thought a trial could be tried in civil district 
court, he could allow it to go there? Or he could send it to a military tribunal? Is that 
your understanding of [the Executive Order authorizing military commissions]? 
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the time that a particular case comes to his desk, he will balance the interests of the 
country and make the appropriate decision at that time. 
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considers any congressional action to preclude trying terrorists in U.S. federal 
courts counterproductive.213 
In addition to trying criminal suspects in U.S. federal court, suspected 
violators of martial law and the laws of war can be tried in courts martial, a 
venue in which Congress prescribes the substantive law (although the 
executive establishes procedure).  If the federal courts and the courts martial 
are found inadequate, an administration can establish military commissions to 
try violations of the laws of war,214 as the United States has eventually done in 
this conflict.  Ad hoc-ism has serious limits and costs, as the last decade’s 
experience demonstrates.  Military commissions may be a costly and  
time-consuming alternative whose advantages to existing tribunals are not 
necessarily obvious and the utility claims for which should be reviewed 
accordingly.215  Finally, U.S. legal experts and authorities should reconsider 
the role of standing international courts, weighing under what circumstances 
the United States could benefit from adjudicating detainee cases in an 
international tribunal and investing in the development of such a tribunal ahead 
of time. 
The bottom-line is that institutional options for prosecution are already 
familiar.  Those subject to criminal detention should be identified and 
categorized expediently and prosecuted promptly. 
B.  Preventive Detention 
Preventive detention has been the object of long and serious thought by 
states party to the Geneva Conventions.  Minimum standards for material 
conditions of wartime detainees, for example, are well elaborated.  The United 
States and other states party to the Conventions developed military regulations 
around Geneva Standards.  Sudden departures should be met with skepticism. 
The obvious proposal regarding those held in preventive detention in the 
present conflict follows an undisputed precedent of international law for 
international armed conflict.216  At the end of hostilities against al Qaeda, the 
United States and its allies should release detainees remaining in preventive 
detention, or charge and try detainees for war crimes.  The features of war 
against a non-state actor and prosecuting conflict in multiple theaters require 
adapting the timing of the application of this rule.  Detainees should be 
released, or charged and tried, when the administration ends hostilities in the 
theater in connection with which the detainee was taken into custody.  That 
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would mean releasing or charging most Guantanamo detainees when the war  
in Afghanistan ends. 217   Detainees whom the United States is holding in 
preventive detention at the DFIP in Afghanistan would similarly be formally 
charged and tried or released when hostilities cease.218  It is unclear whether 
plans to transfer management of the DFIP to Afghan government control 
would complicate such action (or expedite it under Afghan authority). 
Second, serious consideration should be given to the low rates of recidivism 
by those held in preventive detention in Afghanistan.  In 2010, Vice Admiral 
Harward, U.S./ISAF commander of detainee operations in Afghanistan, said 
that of a detainee population numbering over 3,000 in all the years of conflict 
in Afghanistan, he had documented only seventeen cases in which those 
released from preventive detention returned to the battlefield.219  That is a 
recidivism rate of roughly one-half of one percent.  Reasons for that 
astonishingly low rate of battlefield recapture need to be investigated and 
analyzed.  Is the low rate because of treatment or training that took place 
during detention?  Is it related to community guarantees extracted at the time 
of release?  Is it because too many were detained in the first place, including 
wrong place/wrong time non-combatants?  Or is the figure a result of  
under-reporting, understandably missing, in the fog of war, released detainees 
who did return to the battlefield?  Reasons for the low rate of recidivism or, in 
the case of the wrongly detained, first-time fighting by released detainees 
should be carefully analyzed and lessons extracted for future conduct. 
A third proposal is that the length of the conflict, or rather the potential for 
indefinite war, demands that rules regarding length of preventive detention be 
overhauled.  By internationally accepted practice, in the current conflict, the 
United States may hold an adversary in preventive detention through hostilities 
lasting (thus far) twelve years.  Could an adversary be held in preventive 
detention throughout a Thirty Years’ War?  A Hundred Years’ War?220  The 
Detaining Power should be obliged to undertake regular review of the need for, 
or utility of, detention.  In addition, states should consider shifting the burden 
of proof so that, in a conflict of long duration, at some interval, say five years, 
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a detainee held in preventive detention is released unless the Detaining Power 
can establish continued military necessity. 
Effort should be made to examine existing laws of war for international 
armed conflict in order to identify areas left unregulated by those laws or in 
which they are an ill fit for non-international armed conflict.  U.S. lawyers 
should likewise use experience in the present conflict to reflect on the 
limitations of habeas jurisprudence.  The executive branch should disclose 
information regarding the decisional criteria and procedures used by executive 
branch bodies that initially select individuals for detention.  This murky, poorly 
understood, and nonpublicly regulated area should be public interest lawyers’ 
target for greater transparency and accountability.221 
Finally, work should begin on international agreements to facilitate transfers 
of detainees.  The quadrennial review of the Geneva Conventions between 
November 28 and December 1, 2011, focused in part on the issue of detainee 
transfer. 222   The Copenhagen Process, an attempt to formulate rules and 
procedures for detainee transfer initiated by the Government of Denmark, may 
provide helpful ideas for U.S. efforts.223 
C.  Interrogative Detention 
Interrogative detention poses a multitude of uncomfortable challenges.  One 
set of challenges lies in the mechanics and logistics of practice.  Selecting 
detainees for interrogative detention often occurs ad hoc in the field or under 
exigent circumstances.224  Mass “sweeps” of civilians to hold for interrogation, 
as conducted on some occasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, are an affront to the 
international legal principles of distinction and proportionality.  The principle 
of distinction limits military attacks to military objects; it should be analogized 
to inform military activities beyond attacks such as interrogative detention.  
The principle of proportionality prohibits military actions that might produce 
excessive civilian losses in relation to the military advantages gained. 225  
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Poorly discriminating sweeps that subject civilians to unnecessary detention 
and violate human dignity would, by analogy, offend the principle of 
proportionality.  For the Detaining Power, moreover, too many sources of less 
relevant information flood the mosaic and distort the composition; this harms 
intelligence and military efforts.  The United States needs to examine 
systematically its recent experiences with mass detention and re-evaluate 
intelligence gained against costs to counter-terrorism and other foreign policy 
goals.  International law experts might reconsider their conceptualization of 
violence, to allow that violence can be perpetuated through detention as well as 
attack.  That would raise practical questions, such as whether regulations 
concerning inducting people into detention should be more precisely drawn, to 
incorporate the principles of distinction and proportionality. 
Rules for interrogation itself need to incorporate standards of conduct, with 
consequences for violation.  The Obama administration took an important step 
in directing that no detainees be held in CIA facilities, eliminating the 
possibility of legally sanctioned “Black Sites,” closing any  
pre-existing CIA facilities,226 and ensuring that any person detained under the 
aegis of the ongoing conflict is held in a military-run facility open to Red 
Cross inspection227 or, if criminally convicted, in prison.  This is merely a start.  
More is needed. 
Criminal procedure in the United States relies on the “exclusionary rule” to 
prevent misgotten evidence from aiding the prosecution at trial, thereby 
harnessing institutional incentives to prevent abuse by police and 
investigators.228  Similarly, the United States needs to ensure that institutional 
incentives are aligned properly to ensure humane and lawful treatment of those 
in interrogative detention during war.  For example, a bright-line rule could 
guarantee that no information gained from detainee mistreatment may be used 
as actionable intelligence for operations or used in intelligence estimates.  
Criminal liability could attach for any supervisor or implementer who violates 
standards of detainee treatment or any policymaker who formulates policies on 
the basis of information gained from torture.  Best practices for non-coercive 
interrogation should be promulgated; procedures of U.S. domestic 
investigatory agencies like the FBI, developed under the discipline of 
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exclusionary rule jurisprudence, provide a useful starting point.229  The U.S. 
military, both in the standards that it sets for treatment of detainees during 
questioning and in the discipline it imposes on its personnel to obey guidelines, 
provides a threshold to which the intelligence agencies should be held at 
law.230 
Finally, procedures used to review the continued detention of those held for 
questioning are overdue for re-examination.  The underlying principle of the 
laws of war—to set conditions for ending hostilities as humanely and quickly 
as possible—should inform legal standards for state practice.  The standard for 
interrogative detention should be imminent tactical military utility rather than 
possible contribution of bits for a future intelligence synthesis.  Although the 
mosaic may be a useful hermeneutic for intelligence work, it is not worth 
undermining a commitment to detaining as few people as possible, justified 
only by immediate military operation.  The United States needs to establish 
continuous procedures to ascertain if the information a given detainee may 
have remains timely or justifies continued detention. 
As a broader matter, rights advocates would be well advised to acknowledge 
some conclusions gained by empircal observations of state practice.  
Interrogative detention has become a widespread practice in the national 
security context.  Criminal procedure is irrelevant outside of criminal detention 
and seeking its protections will not help detainees held in interrogative 
detention.  Rights advocates would thus be better advised to engage military 
and intelligence counterparts in serious dialogue to formulate detainee 
safeguards that will work. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the Hamdi majority in a case that 
set some of the conceptual parameters for detention in the “war on terror,” 
reminded the executive branch “that a state of war is not a blank check” for the 
exercise of executive power.231  It is time for a reality check about the variety 
of practices conducted under the broad heading of detention in the “war on 
terror.”  Over the past decade, detention assumed an unprecedented importance 
in modern U.S. war-fighting doctrine.  The challenges of conflict against a 
non-state actor outstripped specifications in the law of war regarding  
non-international armed conflict.  In areas where the law was silent or 
compliance poorly monitored, some gravely infelicitous experiments with 
detention ensued.  Categories of detainees and protections blurred.  The U.S. 
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legal community concentrated on the procedures that govern criminal detention 
and the formal trials that bring it to an end, while the U.S. executive branch 
mostly practiced detention for other reasons in the “war on terror,” most 
prominently preventive detention and interrogative detention.  The principles, 
law, and procedures regulating preventive and interrogative detention are 
overdue for the level of scrutiny that military commissions have garnered.  
Under the Obama administration, the U.S government initiated a review of  
its detention procedures.232  The Administration should publicly release the 
review’s findings, allowing public scrutiny and further evaluation of detention 
as practiced in the ongoing conflict.  One goal of broad scrutiny is shared with 
other Articles in this series: to refine the law and standards that guide 
detentions practice so that, in future conflicts, a states’ practice in dealing with 
a non-state actor may advance the fundamental purpose of the law of war, 
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